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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS Article provides an update of judicial and legislative develop-
ments of franchise law in Texas and the Fifth Circuit during the
survey period. Relevant case law and legislative efforts from
around the country regarding Federal Trade Commission rules, decisions,
and prosecutions that impact franchise businesses are also included.
II. FRANCHISE BASICS
A. WHAT IS A FRANCHISE
A franchise is a contractual relationship consisting of three elements:
(1) a significant association between the franchisee's business and the
franchisor's trademarks; (2) payment of a franchise fee; and (3) the
franchisor's right to exercise significant power over, or provide significant
assistance to, the franchisee in the operation of its business. This black
letter definition, however, cannot define the entirety of the relationship
as was recognized by the Seventh Circuit when it stated "[Ilegal terms
often have specialized meanings that can surprise even a sophisticated
party. The term 'franchise,' or its derivative 'franchisee,' is one of those
words."' Given the evolving relationship between parties in the franchise
context, the decisions provided below offer valuable insight into the spe-
cialized meanings provided by franchise law.
B. THE FTC RULE
Pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") regulation rule en-
titled "Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchis-
1. To-Am Equip. Co. v. Mitsubishi Caterpillar Forklift Am., Inc., 152 F.3d 658, 659-60
(7th Cir. 1998).
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ing and Business Opportunity Ventures" (the Disclosure Rule), the FTC
promulgated presale disclosure requirements for franchisors and certain
business opportunity ventures.2 The Disclosure Rule requires disclosure,
but not registration, in connection with the offer and sale of franchises in
the United States. This disclosure requirement is accomplished through a
franchisor's issuance of a Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (the
"UFOC").
The FTC is authorized to seek injunctions and civil penalties and to
assist in consumer redress against Disclosure Rule violations. Since the
Disclosure Rule's 1979 inception, the FIC has determined a wide array
of misrepresentations to be unfair in deceptive practices.
Most recently, the FTC has proposed several changes to its disclosure
requirement, posting a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPR) to its web-
site on October 22, 1999.3 The NPR is designed to modernize the
franchise rule's presale disclosure mandates by taking into account the
dramatic growth of franchising, the increased size and sophistication of
many franchisees, the desire of prospective franchisees to obtain more
relevant information and the vast technological changes of the past two
decades. The FTC proposal will scrap its present UFOC format and will
require several.new disclosures and significant modifications to existing
disclosure obligations. The FTC would also put an end to the current
controversy concerning extraterritorial application of the Franchise Rule
by clearly stating its application only to domestic sales and transactions. 4
The proposed revisions would also allow franchisors to deliver disclosure
documents electronically. This is a significant change from the previous
rule which required exchange of paper documents and the franchisee's
manual signature as evidence of receipt the documents. Furthermore, the
FTC would eliminate the "first personal meeting" disclosure trigger
which requires a franchisor to give the disclosure document to its pro-
spective franchisee at the first substantive face-to-face meeting between
the parties. The only requirement under the new rules would be that the
prospective franchisee have the disclosure document in its hand at least
fourteen business days before signing any franchise agreement or paying
any money to the franchisor.5
Congressman Howard Coble introduced H.B. 3308 on November 10,
1999, a revised version of the "Small Business Franchise Act of 1999."
2. See 16 C.F.R. § 436 (1997). According to this rule, franchisors must make a full
presale disclosure. A franchisor may not legally offer and sell franchises in a state in which
the franchisor has failed to register, and illegal offers or sales create stiff civil and criminal
liability for the franchisor as well as its officers. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (1994).
3. See Franchise Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 57, 293 (1999) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt.
436) (proposed Oct. 22, 1999).
4. See Nieman v. Dryclean U.S.A. Franchise Co., Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH)
11,166 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 1997).
5. See Franchise Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 57, 293 (1999) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt.
436) (proposed Oct. 22, 1999).
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III. MARKETING THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP
A. MISREPRESENTATION
The FTC's primary means of enforcing its powers is contained in sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (the "FTCA") which pro-
vides that "[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and
unfair deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared
unlawful."' 6 To establish a violation of section 5, the FTC must prove (1)
a reasonably prudent person would rely on the deceptive advertisements,
practices or representations; (2) the advertisements, practices or repre-
sentations were widely disseminated; and (3) consumers purchased the
product.7 Furthermore, the omission of material information, whether or
not a misrepresentation, may also constitute a violation of section 5.8
More importantly, liability under section 5 may be found against a corpo-
ration even when based upon the actions of an individual. This will result
when the individual either has (1) directly participated in the violative
action; (2) played a part in controlling, directing or formulating the poli-
cies and practices of the company which violate section 5; or (3) has the
authority to control the actions of other individuals combined with the
actual or constructive knowledge that those individuals were committing
misrepresentations. 9
Furthermore, the FTC may utilize the Disclosure Rule to punish
franchisors for disclosure violations. 10 The Disclosure Rule requires
franchisors to provide prospective franchisees, prior to the sale of the
franchise, a detailed disclosure stating (1) the franchisor's corporate his-
tory, (2) the franchisor's financial condition, (3) the track record of other
franchisees, and (4) the background of the franchisor's principal of-
ficers." In establishing a violation, the FTC must demonstrate that the
franchise sales were subject to the Rule and that the violations of the
Disclosure Rule were made knowingly.12 Franchise sales will be subject
to the Disclosure Rule if: (1) the franchisee grants or promises the right
to distribute goods or services which bear the franchisor's trademark,
tradename, advertising or other commercial symbol; (2) that franchisor
exerts or has the right to exert significant control over the franchisee's
method of operation or the franchisor promises to provide the franchisee
significant assistance in the franchisee's operation; and (3) as a condition
to obtain or begin the franchise relationship, the franchisee must pay or
commit to pay at least $500 to the franchisor or the franchisor's affiliate
at any time before or within six months after the franchise business
6. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000).
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. P.M.C.S., Inc., 21 F. Supp.2d 187, 191 (E.D. N.Y.
1998).






The following cases provide guidance for Texas practitioners in deter-
mining the type of disclosure that the FTC Disclosure Rule requires and
establish the lengths the FTC may go to enforce its powers. In FTC v.
Inetintl. Corn, Inc.,' 4 the founder of an Internet-based company had a
warrant issued for his arrest following a ruling on the FFC's charges of
false earnings claims and inadequate disclosures. The Court's ruling per-
manently barred the company, its founders, and a division marketing di-
rector from participating in the sale of any business venture, franchise, or
investment opportunity and ordered $1,760,000 in consumer redress.15
The FTC originally claimed that the defendants engaged in repeated false
and unsubstantiated earnings claims, failed to provide disclosure docu-
ments, and resorted to the use of actors, posing as "satisfied franchisees,"
to corroborate the claims. 16
In FTC v. iMALL, Inc.,iv a marketing company and its principal sold
Internet consulting businesses to consumers through infomercials, semi-
nars, radio commercials, direct mailings and promotional audio and video
cassettes. In these presentations, investors were offered the opportunity
to purchase their own web page or advertising space on iMALL's In-
ternet site. The FTC claimed that iMALL made false earnings claims and
failed to provide complete and accurate disclosure documents to poten-
tial purchasers. The FFC negotiated a settlement with iMALL and two
of its former principals, forcing them to pay $4,000,000 for violation of the
FTCA and Disclosure Rule. In addition to the fine, the parties were en-
joined from participating in the advertising, promotion, or sale of any
Internet-related business opportunity to pay-per-call service for ten years
after entry of the stipulated judgment.
In United States v. Oliver,18 the FTC alleged that Oliver induced poten-
tial franchisees to purchase franchises by falsely implying that his busi-
ness was affiliated with the federal government. The FTC further alleged
that Oliver failed to provide purchasers with basic disclosure documents
required by the Disclosure Rule. The FTC successfully stopped Oliver's
business of promoting Consumer Protection Agency franchises over the
Internet and forced Oliver to agree to a stipulated judgment permanently
barring him from claiming affiliation with any government entity. In ad-
dition, Oliver was required to create business records for any company he
controls and retain those records for a period of five years after the com-
pany's creation.
In Federal Trade Commission v. P.M.C.S., Inc., the FTC alleged that
the defendants misrepresented to prospective purchasers (1) the amount
of profits they could earn, (2) the demand for electronic medical billing
13. See id.
14. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) § 11,659 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 1999).
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) T 11,624 (C.D. Ca. Apr. 15, 1999).
18. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,549 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 1998).
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services, and (3) the amount of support they would provide to franchisees
in the operation of their business. 19 P.M.C.S. is a New York based com-
pany that sold business opportunity packages containing software that
could be purchased at retail for $69 for fees ranging between $6,000 and
$7,500.20 Aqua Marketing Group, Inc., a Nevada corporation and its sole
shareholder, agreed to serve as the exclusive provider of marketing ser-
vices for P.M.C.S. and the business opportunities it sold. As part of this
arrangement, Aqua hired and trained independent sales representatives
to sell the business opportunities and distribute advertising and promo-
tional materials. The F1C filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in the
case which was denied by the Court on a finding that sufficient issues of
material fact existed. The Court appeared unwilling to grant summary
judgment against Aqua and its sole shareholder because it was unclear
the extent to which they participated in the alleged violations of the
FTCA and FTC Franchise Rule, the extent of consumer injury caused by
any violations, their knowledge of P.M.C.S.'s activities, and the extent to
which the shareholder controller had authority to control Aqua.2 1
In FTC v. Minuteman Press, et al.,22 the FTC alleged that a franchisor
and its affiliate engaged in deceptive and unfair practices in violation of
section 5A of the FTCA. The FIC further alleged that the defendants
violated the disclosure requirements of the Disclosure Rule. After sub-
mission of evidence, the Court concluded that the franchisor did make
false claims regarding gross sales and profitability, failed to provide the
required documentation for those representations, and failed to disclose
transfer and training fees as required by law.23 Interestingly, after the
Court established corporate liability, it then held the individual defend-
ants jointly and severally liable for their participation in and/or their au-
thorization of the Deceptive Practices. Furthermore, pursuant to section
13B of the FTCA the Court granted permanent injunctive relief and con-
cluded that monetary damages and consumer redress would be appropri-
ate. The defendants had argued that written contractual disclaimers
displaced any prior contrary oral representations. The Court concluded
that "a reasonable consumer could legitimately conclude that he or she
was being furnished important specific earnings information.. . to assist
in the decision-making process notwithstanding the general disclaimers
....24 The case suggests not only that written contractual disclaimers
will be overlooked, but also that individual defendants will be held liable
regardless of corporate status.
19. 21 F. Supp.2d 187, 190 (E.D. N.Y. 1998).
20. See id. at 189.
21. See id. at 192.
22. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 1.1,516 (E.D. N.Y. Oct. 2, 1998).
23. See id.




On March 17, 1999, the North American Securities Administrators As-
sociation ("NASAA") released its new disclosure requirement declaring
that franchisors must disclose potential Y2K problems under the Uniform
Franchise Offering Circular Guidelines. 2 5 These NASAA guidelines re-
quire franchisors to "disclose information about any computer systems a
franchisee is required to purchase or update" and encourages the disclo-
sure of potential Y2K problems in dealing with suppliers, financial insti-
tutions, and landlords.2 6 Where franchisors fail to disclose the
information listed above, they may face potential lawsuits from fran-
chisee and even actions by government authorities.
C. EXEMPTIONS FROM THE FRANCHISE RULE
Proof that exemptions can be granted by the FTC is found in In re
Navistar Transportation Corp.27 In this case, the FTC granted a truck
manufacturer an exemption from the Franchise Rule which required
franchisors to provide information to investors. The FTC conceded that
the franchise rule is designed to prevent abuses in instances where poten-
tial investors are inexperienced and unsophisticated, have inadequate
time to review and digest franchise agreements terms, and are at a signifi-
cant information imbalance which makes them unable to gather adequate
information.2 8 Navistar demonstrated to the FTC that its dealers were a
select group of highly sophisticated and experienced business people who
had more than adequate time to consider the dealership offer and obtain
information about it before investing. Given the sophistication of the po-
tential investors, the FTC granted Navistar an exemption.
D. FTC ENFORCEMENT POWERS
As discussed earlier, under section 5(a) of the FTCA, the FTC has the
authority to initiate a court proceeding to prevent unfair and deceptive
practices that affect commerce, including violations of the Disclosure
Rule. 29 The following cases demonstrate the FFC's enforcement powers.
In Oklahoma Department of Securities v. AdmaxNets International
Corp.,30 the State of Oklahoma was granted a temporary restraining or-
der, temporary injunction and the appointment of a receiver for the de-
fendant's company because the Court concluded that AdmaxNets ran
afoul of Oklahoma's Business Opportunity Sales Act. The Court's re-
straining orders prohibited AdmaxNets from violating section 806 of the
Oklahoma Business Opportunity Sales Act by offering or selling business
25. NASAA Release Regarding Y2K Disclosures, Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH)
11,625 (Mar. 17, 1999).
26. Id.
27. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,558 (F.T.C. Nov. 23, 1998).
.28. See id.
29. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1998).
30. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,469 (D. Okla. June 24, 1998).
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opportunities without being registered in the state; from violating section
819(2) of the Act by making misstatements or omitting material facts
from statements; and from violating section 819(3) of the Act in engaging
in behavior that defrauded people in connection with the offer or sale of
opportunities in Oklahoma. 31 As a result, AdmaxNets was forbidden to
conceal or dispose of any assets it owned or possessed and the receiver
was appointed for the specific purpose of accepting and accounting for
the company's funds in the event of later litigation or prosecution.
In Lang, Lang & Suhor Investors, L.L.C. v. The American Bagel Co.,32
American Bagel franchisees in Ohio brought suit against the franchisor
and the owners of Restaurant Development Company ("RDC"), a mar-
keting company hired by American Bagel to market its franchises. In
their lawsuit, the franchisee plaintiffs claimed that the defendants misrep-
resented the earnings and profitability of the Chesapeake Bagel Bakery
franchise, that the plaintiffs relied on these misrepresentations and that
this behavior constituted fraud and violation of the Ohio Business Op-
portunity Purchaser's Protection Act. The franchisees further alleged
that the defendants breached their contracts by failing to provide ade-
quate support to the plaintiffs. American Bagel and RDC moved for
summary judgment and filed a counterclaim for damages arising out of
the termination of the franchise agreement. Defendants obtained a sub-
stantial victory when the Court granted their motions for summary judg-
ment and denied the plaintiff franchisees' motion for summary judgment
on the counterclaim. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs were under
a duty to conduct an independent investigation of the profitability of the
Chesapeake Bagel Bakery franchise and as such could not have reasona-
bly relied on information regarding sales and cost history provided by the
franchisor.33 Furthermore, because the plaintiffs admitted to reading the
UFOC, their claims of oral misrepresentation by RDC were wholly
against the express language provided in the UFOC stating that the
franchisor "does not furnish or authorize its salespersons to furnish any
oral or written information concerning the actual or potential sales, costs,
income or profits of a Chesapeake Bagel Bakery. '34
In FTC v. AmeraPress, Inc.,35 the FTC filed an action against three
corporations which operated joint enterprises to sell business opportuni-
ties involving the sale of calendars, business cards and trading cards. In
its complaint, the FTC alleged that the defendants represented to con-
sumers that they could earn between $20,000 and $200,000 per year by
investing in the business opportunities.36 According to the FTC, these
representations were in violation of the FTCA since purchasers of the
business opportunities often did not come close to the earnings potential
31. See id.
32. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) $ 11,447 (D. Md. Apr. 29, 1998).
33. See id.
34. Id.




promised by the defendants.37 The FTC sought consumer redress, injunc-
tive relief, litigation costs and other relief the Court deemed proper.
Likewise, in FTC v. Summit Photographix,38 the FTC filed an action
against a corporation, two of its owners and two of its officers alleging
practices similar to those complained of in AmeraPress. In addition to
the unlawful claims pertaining to earnings, the FTC also claimed that the
defendants made misrepresentations regarding the exclusivity of the ter-
ritory the purchasers were granted.39 The FTC sought similar relief as
well.
In United States v. QX International, Inc.,n° the FTC filed an action
against a seller of display rack distributorships for automobile engine lu-
bricants. The FTC alleged that the defendant failed to provide purchas-
ers the complete and accurate disclosure documents and that the
defendant misrepresented (1) the level of earnings purchasers could ex-
pect to derive, (2) information pertaining to the company's selected refer-
ences, (3) exclusivity of territory granted, (4) the reliability of location
companies, and (5) the amount of assistance in advertising assistance that
the purchasers would receive.41
IV. THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP
A. TERMINATIONS AND NON-RENEWAL
1. Non-Statutory Termination
A common requirement for termination or non-renewal of a franchise
agreement is that the franchisor give appropriate notice. Failure to give
proper notice may render a termination wrongful. For example, in Uni-
versity Motors Ltd. v. General Motors Corp.42 in a not-for-publication per
curiam opinion, the Fourth Circuit in an affirmed a district court's order
enjoining termination of an automobile dealership and requiring General
Motors to pay the plaintiff's legal fees. The district court concluded that
GM, as a matter of law, had failed to provide sufficient notice and lacked
good cause for its attempted termination.43 West Virginia's Motor Vehi-
cle Dealer Franchise statute required notice of termination to be served
by certified mail. GM's termination letter was hand delivered. After the
dealer sued, GM sent notice by certified mail. The court found that the
later notice was insufficient to cure the deficiency in the manner of deliv-
ery because the statute lacked any provision authorizing supplemental
notice.44
The district court also found that GM lacked good cause for termina-
37. See id.
38. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,355 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 1998).
39. See id.
40. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,354 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 1998).
41. See id.
42. No. 97-2612, 98-1811, 1999 WL 11270 (4th Cir. Jan. 13, 1999).
43. See id.
44. See id. at *2
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tion of the franchise. 45 The bases for GM's termination were the dealer's
failure to obtain permission to carry a Nissan line and other unspecified
deficiencies in sales, service, and working capital. However, under the
West Virginia statute, good cause for termination required proper notice
and 180 days to cure. Because GM had given inadequate notice and had
allowed only a 90-day cure period, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's judgment granting a permanent injunction against GM.46
In contrast, good cause for termination was found in Thacker v.
Gymboree Corp.47 The California court held that a franchise agreement
authorized termination of a franchisee who: (1) offered unauthorized
programs; (2) incurred excessive customer complaints; and (3) engaged in
conduct which reflected "materially and unfavorably upon the operation
of the franchise business. '48 The Gymboree franchisee had instituted
"drop-off" and "combined-age programs" that essentially turned the chil-
dren's gymnastic franchise into a babysitting service. Citing concerns
about safety and quality of instruction and the large number of customer
complaints, the franchisor gave notice of termination. The court found
that even after notice and an opportunity to cure, the franchisee contin-
ued to offer unauthorized programs involving serious safety and insur-
ance issues, offered drop-off babysitting programs in an unsafe
environment, combined ages and classes, and received excessive cus-
tomer complaints, justifying termination.49
Wrongful termination cases do not always arise in the context of a fran-
chisee seeking injunctive relief to prevent an impending termination.
They also arise in the context of a franchisor's claims for trademark in-
fringement by a franchisee continuing to use the franchisor's marks after
the franchise has been terminated. To obtain an injunction for trademark
infringement by a terminated franchisee, a franchisor must first establish
that it had a legal right to terminate the franchise. In McDonald's Corp.
v. Robertson,50 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court's grant of
preliminary relief enjoining a terminated franchisee's continued use of
the McDonald's trademark. The franchise agreement required the
Robertsons to operate in accordance with quality, safety, and cleanliness
("QSC") standards and allowed McDonald's to terminate the contract if
they failed to do so. On several occasions in 1995 and 1996, McDonald's
conducted audits of the Robertsons' restaurants and found non-compli-
ance with QSC standards. On each occasion, McDonald's advised the
Robertsons of the deficiencies and recommended corrective action. In
1996, McDonald's advised the Robertsons that McDonald's had pur-
chased property one block from their restaurant to build a new restaurant
and offered the Robertsons the new location. Because of increased rent
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) $ 11,623 (Cal. Super. Sept. 23, 1998).
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. 147 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 1998).
1064 [Vol. 53
FRANCHISE LAW
and service fees applicable to the new franchise, the Robertsons declined.
McDonald's offered an income guarantee at the new location. The
Robertsons declined. McDonald's offered to purchase the Robertsons'
franchise. Again, the Robertsons refused. In the spring of 1997, McDon-
ald's conducted two more inspections of the restaurant. These audits dis-
closed many of the same deficiencies uncovered during earlier audits.
The Robertsons failed to provide McDonald's with a plan to cure the
deficiencies. McDonald's then delivered a notice of default containing a
cure period of 60 days. During the 60-day cure period, the Robertsons
failed two more audits. McDonald's sent the Robertsons a notice of ter-
mination. The Robertsons refused to surrender the premises and contin-
ued to operate the restaurant as a McDonald's using various trade names
and trademarks registered to McDonald's. McDonald's sued for trade-
mark infringement and asked for a preliminary injunction. The district
court enjoined the Robertsons.5 1
In a question of first impression, the Eleventh Circuit followed the
Third Circuit holding that, to prevail on the merits of a trademark in-
fringement claim against a franchisee, a franchisor must show that he
properly terminated the contract purporting to authorize the trademark's
use.52 Thus, in order to obtain an injunction, McDonald's had to show
that it properly terminated the Robertsons' franchise agreement. The
Robertsons claimed that the QSC failures were merely pretextual be-
cause McDonald's wanted to make more money by moving the Robert-
sons' McDonald's to another location. The Eleventh Circuit found that,
even if this allegation were correct, the Robertsons' failure to comply
with McDonald's QSC and food safety standards constituted a material
breach of the franchise agreement sufficient to justify termination, and
thus, it did not matter whether McDonald's also possessed an ulterior,
improper motive for termination. 53
The New Jersey Court of Appeals relied on Robertson in finding
against a franchisor in Ispahani v. Allied Domecq Retailing USA. 54 In
Ispahani, the franchisee sued Dunkin' Donuts alleging that it unjustifi-
ably withheld approval of a new store location after he had incurred sub-
stantial expenses in preparing a new site. Dunkin' Donuts
counterclaimed for breach of contract due to the franchisee's failure to
pay royalties. When the franchisee failed to cure after receiving notices
of default and notices to cure, Dunkin' Donuts terminated the franchise.
Dunkin' Donuts then moved for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the
franchisee from using Dunkin' Donuts' marks. The appellate court af-
firmed the trial court's denial of injunctive relief because Dunkin' Donuts
failed to establish that it had the legal right to terminate the franchise
agreement.55 The court refused to follow the small minority of jurisdic-
51. See id. at 132.
52. S & R Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Int'l, Inc., 968 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1992).
53. See Section V, infra for further discussion of McDonald's Corp. v. Robertson.
54. 727 A.2d 1023 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
55. See id. at 1025.
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tions in which wrongful termination claims are not valid defenses to a
Lanham Act claim but merely independent claims for damages. The
court found that under New Jersey law, franchisees cannot be prelimina-
rily enjoined from operating their franchises and utilizing Lanham Act
trademarks without proof that the franchise was rightfully terminated for
cause. Facts bearing on termination for cause were "sparse and con-
tested."5 6 Dunkin' Donuts proved that Ispahani had not paid royalties
and advertising fees on time. The amount due and unpaid was disputed.
Both sides relied on conclusory statements without underlying records to
substantiate their claims, and neither party offered proof of the total
amount of royalties and advertising fees paid. Ispahanis' testimony that
Dunkin' Donuts consented to late payments was uncontroverted. On
these facts, the court found that Dunkin' Donuts had failed to carry its
burden of establishing that termination was proper.57
2. Statutory Termination
In addition to contractual or common law requirements limiting rights
to terminate, franchisors must also satisfy any applicable statutes. For
example, the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act ("PMPA")5 8 prohibits
termination or non-renewal of franchisees engaged in the sale, consign-
ment, or distribution of motor fuel except for statutorily defined grounds
and subject to notice and cure provisions. Congress enacted the PMPA in
1978 to protect petroleum franchisees from arbitrary or discriminatory
termination or non-renewal of their franchises. In keeping with the Act's
acknowledgment of the inferior economic and bargaining position of
franchisees, a franchisor who terminates or does not renew a franchise
has the burden of proving compliance with all statutory requirements of
the PMPA. Additionally, the Act allows franchisees to obtain a prelimi-
nary injunction upon a lesser showing than is usually required. 59 The ef-
fect of the PMPA is to create a presumption that any termination of a
franchise is unlawful.
The PMPA was invoked by Amoco branded dealers in the Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania area to enjoin Amoco from terminating their dealer leases
in Fink v. Amoco Corp.60 Amoco sent the dealers a notice that Amoco
was terminating the leases effective when Amoco closed the sale of assets
to a purchaser approved by the FTC. Amoco contended that it was di-
vesting itself of the stations pursuant to a consent decree negotiated
under threat of civil litigation by the FTC following the merger of Amoco
Corporation and British Petroleum Company. Amoco also claimed that
the negotiated consent decree was "an occurrence of an event which is
relevant" under section 2802(b)(2)(c) of the PMPA and, therefore,
56. Id.
57. See id. at 1023-25.
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806 (1999).
59. See id.
60. 55 F. Supp. 2d 350, 351 (W.D. Pa. 1999).
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Amoco's proposed termination of the franchise agreements was lawful.61
Pursuant to the consent order, Amoco negotiated the sale of twenty-nine
regional independent Amoco gasoline service stations to Tosco Corpora-
tion. As a result, plaintiffs were notified that their leases had been can-
celled and their contracts terminated and were instructed to quit the
premises or sign new leases with Tosco. Plaintiffs received no compensa-
tion for the contract terminations or cancelled leases and were denied any
opportunity to purchase their stations. The terms of the Tosco leases
were unfavorable to the dealers. The court concluded that nothing in the
PMPA permits a franchisor to terminate a franchise agreement due to the
threat of civil litigation by a third party, including a government agency,
and that Amoco's attempted termination was unlawful. In addition, the
court found that Amoco's conduct was arbitrary and capricious and en-
tered a preliminary injunction enjoining Amoco from terminating plain-
tiffs' agreements. 62
Another injunction in favor of a franchisee under the PMPA was af-
firmed in Kamel v. Shell Oil Co.63 Shell attempted to terminate Kamel's
franchise due to alleged financial hardship caused by the State of Califor-
nia's pending enforcement of certain environmental regulations. The dis-
trict court granted the franchisee a preliminary injunction. Shell
appealed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, citing the liberal preliminary in-
junction standards under the PMPA.64
Under the PMPA, a district court should grant a preliminary injunction
if a franchisee shows that "there exists sufficiently serious questions going
to the merits to make such questions a fair ground for litigation" and "the
court determines that, on balance, the hardships imposed upon the
franchisor by the issuance of such preliminary injunctive relief will be less
than the hardship which would be imposed upon such franchisee if such
preliminary injunctive relief were not granted. ''65 Noting Kamel's testi-
mony that the income generated by the station constituted the primary
source of income for him and his family, that Kamel expended considera-
ble money in maintaining the station, and balancing his injury against the
trial court's determination that a ruling adverse to Shell would require
only that Shell continue the franchise relationship until the lawsuit was
resolved, the appellate court concluded that the balance of hardship
weighed in Kamel's favor. The court also found that Kamel would likely
prevail on the merits because Shell had failed to comply with the notice
provisions of the PMPA.66 To satisfy the notice requirements, a
franchisor must demonstrate it first acquired actual or constructive
knowledge "of an event which is relevant to the franchise relationship
and as a result of which termination of the franchise ... is reasonable...
61. Id. at 353.
62. See id. at 354-56.
63. No. 98-56812, 199 WL 413414 (9th Cir. June 11, 1999).
64. See id. at *3.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 2805(b)(2)(ii) & (iii) (2000).
66. See Kamel, 1999 WL 413414, at *2.
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not more than 120 days prior to the date on which notification of termina-
tion.., is given .... ",67 Because Shell knew the State of California would
enforce the relevant regulations well over 120 days before Shell sent a
termination notice to Kamel, it failed to comply with the procedural re-
quirements of the PMPA. Hence, the district court did not abuse its dis-
cretion when it concluded that Kamel was likely to prevail on the
merits.68
In contrast, in Mercer v. Texaco, Inc.,69 a franchisee sought to avoid
application of the PMPA. Mercer sued Texaco Star, a Texaco partnership
entity, and Spencer, an affiliate of Texaco who distributed franchises, for
tortious interference with business relations and improper debranding
arising from Spencer's termination of Mercer. Texaco removed the case
to federal court claiming plaintiff "artfully pled" his tortious interference
and wrongful debranding claims to avoid a previous adverse judgment.
Texaco further claimed that the state law claims were preempted by the
PMPA giving the court federal question jurisdiction. 70 The district court
granted defendants' summary judgment, holding that the PMPA pre-
empted any state law claims "arising out of" or "incident to" an alleged
wrongful termination and any attempt by Mercer to reallege its claims
under the PMPA would be time barred by the statute's one-year statute
of limitations. 71
B. ENCROACHMENT, GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
Encroachment occurs when a franchisor places a new franchise in an
existing franchisee's market. Many franchise agreements have express
provisions dealing with this issue. 72 In the absence of a contractual provi-
sion expressly granting or reserving territorial rights, a question arises
whether a franchisee can assert an encroachment claim. The most recent
noteworthy case involving encroachment is Burger King Corp. v.
Weaver.73 Weaver, however, must be considered against the background
of Scheck v. Burger King Corp.74 which held that a franchisor could
breach an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by placing a
new franchise in an existing franchisee's market even when the existing
franchisee's franchise agreement granted no exclusive territory or pro-
tected area.75
67. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(2)(C) & (i) (2000).
68. See Kamel, 1999 WL 413414, at *2.
69. No. Civ. A.3:98-CV-1011-R, 1999 WL 451224 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 1999).
70. See id. at *1-'2.
71. See id. at *4-*5.
72. See Clark v. America's Favorite Chicken Co., 110 F.3d 295, 299 (5th Cir. 1997)
(holding that any competition created by a franchisor did not breach a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing because in the franchise agreement the franchisor specifically re-
served the right to establish competing businesses).
73. 169 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 145 L.Ed.2d 287, 120 S. Ct. 370 (1999).
74. 756 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Fla. 1991), on rehearing, 798 F. Supp. 692 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
75. See id. at 548-50.
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Weaver was a party to two franchise agreements with Burger King au-
thorizing him to operate restaurants in Great Falls, Montana. Neither
contract expressly limited the location of further Burger King restaurants
nor expressly reserved the right to Burger King to establish competing
businesses in the area. After Burger King authorized the opening of an-
other restaurant in Great Falls, Weaver stopped all payments. Burger
King sued to collect past due amounts and Weaver counterclaimed for
breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district
court rejected Weaver's implied covenant claim, reasoning that Florida
courts do not recognize a claim for breach of an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing absent breach of an express contractual provision.
Because Weaver did not allege Burger King's action violated an express
provision of the franchise agreement, the court held that his claim under
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing failed as a matter of
law.76 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting the reasoning of Scheck,
finding that Florida common law neither recognized an independent
claim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith absent a breach of
an express contractual provision nor allowed an implied covenant to be
used to vary the express terms of a contract.77 The court found the rea-
soning of Scheck unconvincing stating:
The Scheck court held that the franchisee had a cause of action, even
though the franchise agreement provided no right to exclusive terri-
tory, because BKC had not expressly reserved the right to license
additional Burger King Restaurants nearby. The flaw in this reason-
ing is that right and duty are different sides of the same coin; if one
party to a contract has no RIGHT to exclusive territory, the other
party has no DUTY to limit licensing new restaurants. 78
Thus, because Weaver's franchise agreements did not grant him the
right to an exclusive territory, Burger King had no duty to refrain from
licensing new franchises in the same market.
An encroachment claim grounded in part on an implied covenant also
failed in Linquist & Craig Hotels & Resorts, Inc. v. Holiday Inns Franchis-
ing, Inc.79 The franchisee sued after the franchisor licensed three new
hotels in the same vicinity as the franchisee's existing hotels, claiming that
the franchisor had breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. The court rejected this argument and granted summary judg-
ment for Holiday Inns because the franchise agreement expressly granted
the franchisee a non-exclusive license and specifically authorized the
franchisor to "engage in or license any business activity at any other loca-
tions." 80 In rejecting the franchisee's implied covenant claim, the court
concluded that because the contracts gave Holiday Inns the express right
to license new franchisees at any location that right could not be circum-
76. See Weaver, 169 F.3d at 1314.
77. See id. at 1314-18.
78. Id. at 1317 (emphasis added).
79. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,514 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 1998).
80. Id. at 31,245.
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scribed by an implied covenant of good faith.8 '
The opposite result was reached in Unidrug, S.A.R.L. v. E.T. Browne
Drug Co., Inc.82 based upon New Jersey law that a claim for breach of a
duty of good faith and fair dealing exists even when a party does not
breach an express term of a contract. Unidrug was the exclusive distribu-
tor of Browne's skin and hair care products. The contract was terminable
by either party on 90 days' notice. Browne terminated the agreement.
Before 90 days had passed, Browne entered into an exclusive distribution
agreement with a Unidrug competitor and refused to fill a Unidrug order.
Unidrug sued for breach of contract and violation of an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. The district court granted summary judg-
ment for Browne. 83 The Third Circuit reversed, holding that under New
Jersey law every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing that can be breached even when a party does not breach an
express term of the contract. The Third Circuit remanded the case for
consideration of whether the manufacturer violated a duty of good faith
and fair dealing by refusing to ship goods to its distributor and selling to
the distributor's competitor while the distributor had an exclusive
contract.8
4
Good faith and fair dealing cases often turn on choice of law issues.
For example, in Miller v. KFC Corp.,85 KFC franchisees sued for failure
to award them a "3N1" (KFC, Taco Bell, and Pizza Hut) franchise at an
outlet mall. Among other things, the plaintiffs contended that KFC
breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. KFC argued
Texas law does not recognize an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. The court rejected the defendant's argument, finding that Ken-
tucky law applied and that under Kentucky law every contract has an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. KFC countered that
Kentucky law required a fiduciary relationship to exist for the breach of
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court denied
KFC's motion to dismiss, because under Kentucky law, it is not always
necessary for a fiduciary relationship to exist in order to assert a claim for
breach of good faith.86
C. TRANSFERS OF FRANCHISE RIGHTS
The Texas Supreme Court refused to review an appellate court's deci-
sion in a franchise transfer case over a vigorous dissent in Re/Max, Inc. v.
Katar Corp.87 Katar operated a Re/Max Realty office. After two years
Katar decided to sell its franchise and enlisted Re/Max's assistance in lo-
cating a buyer. About the same time Katar defaulted in payment of fees
81. See id. at 31,246.
82. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,415 (3d Cir. Mar. 2, 1998).
83. See id. at 30,701.
84. See id. at 30,705-06.
85. No. Civ. A.3:99-CV-1566-D, 1999 WL 820389 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 1999).
86. See id. at *1-'4.
87. 989 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. 1999).
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to Re/Max. Re/Max repeatedly notified Katar that it was in default and
that failure to pay the fees would result in termination. After Katar
failed to pay royalties for six months, Re/Max notified Katar that it would
no longer honor the exclusivity provision of their agreement unless all
fees were paid current. By that time Katar had found a buyer, but the
buyer was not interested in a non-exclusive franchise, and Re/Max re-
fused to offer the buyer an exclusive franchise even if delinquent royalties
were paid. The sale fell through and Katar sued Re/Max for breach of
contract and tortious interference with the prospective sale. The trial
court awarded Katar $65,000 in damages and $28,000 in legal fees. The
court of appeals affirmed 88 and the Supreme Court denied review.8 9 On
appeal, Re/Max contended that because it had the right to terminate the
entire agreement for Katar's failure to pay royalties, it could terminate
the exclusivity portion of the agreement. The appellate court disagreed
reasoning:
By analogy, a jeweler who sells a diamond ring on installment pay-
ments may have the right to repossess the ring upon default by the
buyer. However, the jeweler does not have the right to replace the
diamond with a cubic zirconia and then hold the customer to the
original contract price.90
In his dissent to denial of review by the Texas Supreme Court, Justice
Hecht declared it a fundamental principle of contract law that a breach
by one party excuses the other from any obligation to perform.91 A fran-
chisee cannot refuse to pay franchise fees and then complain when the
franchisor refuses to continue the exclusive arrangement.
D. NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS
The importance of careful drafting, particularly of noncompetition and
other restrictive covenants, is illustrated by Grease Monkey International,
Inc. v. Ralco Lubrication Services, Inc.92 In that case, the court denied a
franchisor's request for preliminary injunction to enforce a non-competi-
tion agreement precluding a former franchisee and its principal from op-
erating a fast service auto lube business at a former franchise location.
Robert Lieberman, the franchisee, was the sole officer, director, and
shareholder of Ralco Lubrication Services. The franchise agreement con-
tained a two-year, 50-mile noncompete provision. Two days after the
franchise expired, Ralco sold its inventory to Roadrunner Lube and Go,
LLC, which was owned by Lieberman's wife and mother-in-law. Road-
runner then employed Lieberman, replaced Grease Monkey's logos,
signs, and promotional and advertising materials with its own and began
operation of a fast service auto lube business under the name "Roadrun-
88. See Re/Max, Inc. v. Katar Corp., 961 S.W.2d 324, 328 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1997, pet. denied).
89. See Re/Max, Inc., 989 S.W.2d at 363.
90. See Re/Max, Inc., 961 S.W.2d at 327.
91. See Re/Max, Inc., 961 S.W.2d at 364-65.
92. 24 F. Supp. 2d 120 (D. Mass. 1998).
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ner Lube and Go" at the Grease Monkey location. Grease Monkey sued
Lieberman and Ralco, seeking a preliminary injunction to enforce the
noncompete. The trial court denied the injunction, finding a serious
question whether Roadrunner and its principals were the alter ego of Lie-
berman and the former franchisee. Because the franchise agreement pre-
scribed only post-termination conduct of the "franchisee" and did not
expressly address the conduct of officers, directors, and shareholders and
because Lieberman signed only in his capacity as Ralco's president and
not individually, it was uncertain whether Lieberman was individually
bound by the agreement. The court also found that Grease Monkey
failed to demonstrate that it would suffer irreparable harm should prelim-
inary relief be denied, while Lieberman's ability to earn a living in his
chosen field would be substantially curtailed if he were enjoined. Finally,
the court concluded that the public interest would be adversely affected
by granting Grease Monkey's motion because consumers would be de-
prived of a fast service automobile lubrication service. 93
Even in the absence of noncompetition covenants, a franchisor may
limit the ability of a departing franchisee employee to compete if it is
probable that the employee would use or disclose confidential informa-
tion learned while working for the franchisor. In Conley v. DSC Commu-
nications Corp.,94 the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed an injunction
against a former employee of DSC, a manufacturer of telecommunica-
tions equipment. 95 Conley had worked for DSC for 16 years when he
resigned and went to work for Advanced Fiber Communications (AFC),
a DSC competitor. Within days after Conley resigned, DSC obtained a
temporary restraining order prohibiting him from using or disclosing
DSC's confidential or proprietary information, particularly any informa-
tion relating to his marketing efforts towards Sprint. The trial court
found that Conley would inevitably disclose or use confidential informa-
tion or trade secrets of DSC in connection with his employment with
AFC.96
On appeal, the court recognized that a former employee may be en-
joined from using or disclosing a former employer's confidential or pro-
prietary information if the employee is in a situation where use or
disclosure is probable. Conley suggested the court adopt five factors to
determine whether to enjoin an employee: (1) the existence of miscon-
duct on the part of the departing employee; (2) the new employer's ap-
parent need for the trade secret information of its competitors because of
its lack of comparable technology; (3) a significant degree of similarity
between the employee's former and current position; (4) the absence of
efforts of the new employer to protect the trade secrets of the former
93. See id. at 123-26.
94. No. 05-98-01051-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 1321 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.
h.) (unpublished).
95. See id. at *3.
96. See id. at *1-*3.
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employer; and (5) the existence of a noncompetition agreement. 97 With
respect to the first factor, misconduct, the court agreed that the miscon-
duct of an employee in taking or threatening to use a former employer's
confidential information was a factor supporting issuance of a temporary
injunction. However, the court disagreed that a finding of misconduct
was necessary for a temporary injunction. With respect to the second
factor, the court disagreed that the new employer's lack of comparable
technology was determinative. Rather the focus should be on whether
the new employer could use the trade secret information to its benefit or
to the detriment of the former employer. With reference to the third
factor, degree of similarity, the court found it could be a factor only to the
extent the evidence showed whether the former employee was in a posi-
tion to use the former employer's confidential information. The court
rejected Conley's fourth suggested factor, new employer's efforts to pro-
tect the trade secrets, observing:
At best, relying on the new employer to protect the trade secrets of
the former employer when those trade secrets could work to the new
employer's advantage is little better than asking the fox to guard the
henhouse. The richer the henhouse, the less wise it is to trust even
the most responsible and reliable of foxes.98
The court similarly rejected Conley's fifth factor, the existence of a
noncompetition agreement, finding that it had no bearing on whether an
employee possessed confidential information and was in a position to use
it in his new job. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in
issuing a temporary injunction because Conley was in a position to use
DSC's confidential information for his or AFC's benefit or to DSC's
detriment.99
In contrast, a preliminary injunction to enforce post-termination provi-
sions of a franchise agreement was denied in Snelling & Snelling, Inc. v.
Ryvis, Inc.100 Ryvis, Inc., had two franchise agreements to operate per-
sonnel placement service businesses in Las Vegas and Reno, Nevada.
Ryvis advised Snelling of its intent to terminate the franchise agreements;
Snelling responded by terminating the agreements for cause. Snelling
then sought a preliminary injunction to require Ryvis to comply with
post-termination obligations under the franchise agreements including:
(1) that for a two-year period Ryvis not solicit clients or employees whom
it served or employed; (2) that it relocate any continuing personnel busi-
ness to a place situated at least ten miles from former franchise locations;
and (3) that it return materials as required by the agreement. 10 1 The
court refused a preliminary injunction, finding Snelling failed to demon-
strate a substantial threat of irreparable injury because Snelling was not
currently competing in the Las Vegas or Reno markets, nor had it ex-
97. See id. at *4.
98. Id. at *6.
99. See id. at *12 - *18.
100. No. 3:99, CV-2028-D, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17928 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
101. See id. at *2 - *4.
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pressed an intent to enter those markets. Therefore, Snelling could not
establish that it was currently losing customers it would otherwise have
served or employees it would have otherwise employed or that its good-
will or reputation were being damaged. 10 2
E. CONTRACT CLAIMS
The benefits of a carefully drafted franchise agreement were again
demonstrated in Love Pontiac, Cadillac, Buick, GMC Truck, Inc. v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp.103 In Love, the Fourth Circuit in an unpublished opin-
ion affirmed summary judgment in favor of General Motors on a dealer's
claims for breach of contract and violation of South Carolina's "Regula-
tion of Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers" law.' 04 Love operated
a General Motors dealership in Burton, South Carolina. The contract
expressly reserved GMC's "right to revise Dealer's Area of Primary Re-
sponsibility ["APR"] at Division's sole discretion consistent with dealer
network planning objectives." 105 The agreement further provided that
GMC "reserve[d] the right to appoint additional dealers" and explicitly
left the final decision solely to GMC "pursuant to its business judg-
ment. 106 Love proposed establishing a satellite dealership on Hilton
Head Island. GMC turned down Love's proposal and notified Love that
it had decided to appoint another dealer to sell GMC trucks on Hilton
Head. Love sued, claiming GMC breached the terms of its contract by
appointing an additional dealer in Love's APR and reducing its APR
without adequate consideration of Love's interest. The court found that
the contract was not ambiguous and clearly reserved GMC's "right to
resolve Dealer's Area of Primary Responsibility at division's sole discre-
tion consistent with dealer network planning objectives."' 0 7 Further, the
contract clearly left the final decision to GMC "pursuant to its business
judgment."10 8 Plaintiff also contended that GM violated a South Caro-
lina law regulating unfair methods of competition dealing with manufac-
turers, distributors, and dealers of motor vehicles which prohibited "any
102. See id. at *8, *14.
103. 173 F.3d 851 (4th Cir. 1999) (unpublished opinion).
104. See id. at *11.
105. Id. at *3.
106. See id. at *3 - *4.
107. Id. at *6.
108. Love Pontiac, at *4. Other courts have construed similar clauses favorably to man-
ufacturers. See Clair Int'l, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 124 F.3d 314, 317 (1st
Cir. 1997) (affirming dismissal of suit by dealer claiming new dealership was improperly
awarded to third party by construing contract provision that final decision to establish ad-
ditional dealers was to be made solely by manufacturer pursuant to its own business judg-
ment without dealer's consent); Hubbard Chevrolet Co. v. General Motors Corp., 873 F.2d
873, 878 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 978 (1989), (affirming summary judgment for
defendant because exercise of sole discretion granted by contract cannot constitute breach
when GM cited reasons for its decision); Olympic Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors Corp.,
959 F. Supp. 918, 927 (N.D. I11. 1997) (finding that although the contract stated that its
purpose was to permit dealers to fully realize opportunities for business success, that lan-
guage did not render ambiguous, or contradict, other provisions in the contract that left the
decision solely to GM).
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action which is arbitrary, in bad faith, or unconscionable." 10 9 The court
rejected this claim, finding GMC's actions were not in bad faith because
they were based on a reasonable exercise of business judgment." 0
F. FIDUCIARY DUTY
The majority of courts hold that a franchisor-franchisee, dealer-distrib-
utor, or manufacturer-distributor relationship does not create a fiduciary
duty. 1 For example, in Collins v. International Dairy Queen,11 2 a Geor-
gia court dismissed plaintiffs' claim that International Dairy Queen
breached a fiduciary duty to them in its management of an advertising
fund. Plaintiffs alleged Dairy Queen breached a fiduciary duty "to man-
age, in the best interests of the Dairy Queen system, an advertising fund
to which the franchisees pay contractually required advertising fees."' 1 3
In so doing, the plaintiffs rely on a letter written by Dairy Queen's vice
president of marketing stating that the "corporation has a fiduciary re-
sponsibility and contractual obligation to each store to expend the adver-
tising dollars and select the method and ad agency that does the best job
for the benefit of the majority of stores."'114 In addition, company repre-
sentatives had stated that the Dairy Queen franchise system is a "family"
and that Dairy Queen will look out for the franchisees' best interests and
be accountable to them for management of the advertising fund. Pointing
out that the marketing representative was not a lawyer and that his state-
ment was made after the franchisees had already entered into franchise
agreements and, therefore, could not have induced reliance, the court
found that the extra-contractual statements of defendant's representa-
tives were insufficient to create a fiduciary relationship and to modify a
contractual provision which gave Dairy Queen sole discretion to establish
advertising and promotion programs. 1 5
G. VICARIOUs LIABILITY
Generally, a franchisor is not vicariously liable for the negligence of a
franchisee unless the franchisor has the right to control the work from
which the claim arises. An express disclaimer of an agency relationship in
the franchise agreement is not determinative; courts look at the actual
practices of the parties in determining operating control. The essential
109. See id. at *8.
110. See id. at *9.
111. See ARA Auto. Group v. Central Garage, Inc., 124 F.3d 720, 721 (5th Cir. 1997);
Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, 970 F.2d 273,280
(7th Cir. 1992); McGuirk Oil Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 889 F.2d 734, 738 (6th Cir. 1989);
O'Neal v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 860 F.2d 1341, 1349-50 (6th Cir. 1988); Domed Stadium
Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 485 (5th Cir. 1984); Crim Truck & Tractor
Co. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 592-93 (Tex. 1992); Adolph Coors Co.
v. Rodriguez, 780 S.W.2d 477, 481 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
112. 54 F. Supp. 2d 1351 (M.D. Ga. 1999).
113. Id. at 1352.
114. Id. at 1353.
115. See id. at 1354.
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issue is whether the franchisor has the right to control both the means
and details of the process by which the alleged agent is to accomplish his
task.'16
In Arguello v. Conoco, Inc.,117 the court granted Conoco's motion for
summary judgment, holding that it was not liable for the racially discrimi-
natory acts of employees of a franchisee. The alleged incidents occurred
at five gas stations in Texas, four of which were owned and operated by
franchisees. Plaintiffs claimed that the franchisor and his franchisees en-
gaged in "intentional discrimination" in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and
that the franchisor discriminated by not providing the "full and equal en-
joyment of goods" in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. The court defined
the issue as "to what extent can a third-party hold a franchisor liable for
the torts of the employees of a franchisee."' 1 8
The court first addressed the basic question whether an agency rela-
tionship existed between Conoco and Conoco branded stores by focus-
sing on the essential element, the right of control. Plaintiff attempted to
establish the element of control by introducing agreements between Co-
noco and its franchisees which required each store to treat all customers
"fairly, honestly, and courteously."'" 9 The agreements also contained a
provision defining the relationship between the parties as follows:
The [store] is an independent business and is not, nor are its employ-
ees, an employee of Conoco. Conoco and the [store] are completely
separate entities. They are not partners, general partners, limited
partners, joint venturers, nor agents of each of other in any sense
whatsoever and neither has the power to obligate or bind the
other. 120
To overcome this express "no agency" clause, the court required plain-
tiffs to produce evidence showing the true operating agreement was one
which vested the right to control in Conoco. Plaintiffs produced no evi-
dence that Conoco controlled the details of the daily operation of the
stores. In contrast, Conoco presented evidence that hiring and firing de-
cisions were left to the absolute discretion of each store. Therefore, the
court held as a matter of law that the stores were not agents of Conoco
and, therefore, Conoco was not liable for the discriminatory acts of the
franchisees' employees. 121
Next, the court considered whether Conoco was liable for the discrimi-
natory acts of an employee working at a company-owned station. Under
the common law of agency, an employer is liable only for torts of an em-
ployee committed within the course and scope of employment. 122 Inten-
116. In re Carolin Paxson Adver., Inc., 938 F.2d 595, 598 (5th Cir. 1991).
117. No. 3:97-CV-0638-H, 1998 WL 713277 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 1998), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 207 F.3d 803 (5th Cir. 2000).
118. Id. at *5.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See id.; see also Perry v. Burger King Corp., 924 F. Supp. 548, 554 n.4 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (listing analogous cases finding franchisee is not the agent of the franchisor).
122. See id. at *6.
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tional torts are usually outside the scope of employment. However, an
employer may be liable for actions of an employee which are outside the
scope of employment if (1) the employer intended the conduct or conse-
quences of the action; (2) the employer was negligent or reckless; (3) the
conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the employer; or (4) the em-
ployee purported to act or speak on behalf of the employer and there was
reliance on apparent authority. 123 The court concluded that the employ-
ees' actions were outside the scope of employment, and the plaintiffs
failed to offer any supporting evidence of any factor which would render
Conoco liable under section 219 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment for Conoco
on this claim as well. 124
Of course, a franchisor may have direct liability for its own negligence
in discharging an independent duty to a customer. The leading case in
this area is Read v. Scott Fetzer Co.125 In Read, Kirby, a manufacturer of
vacuum cleaners, sold its cleaners to independent distributors pursuant to
a uniform distributorship agreement which required the distributor to es-
tablish an independent sales force of door-to-door dealers. The distribu-
torship agreement specifically provided that Kirby "shall exercise no
control over the selection of ... Dealers."'1 26 Dealers were required to
sell Kirby products exclusively through in-home demonstrations. A
dealer, who was an independent contractor of Kirby's distributor, raped a
customer during an in-home demonstration. The distributor did not
check the dealer's references. If it had, it would have learned that he had
been terminated from a previous job because he had received deferred
adjudication on a charge of indecency with a child and that, at other jobs,
employers had received complaints from women about his sexually inap-
propriate behavior. The Texas Supreme Court held that when a company
that markets and sells its product through independent contractor distrib-
utors exercises control by requiring in-home demonstration sales, it owes
a duty to act reasonably in the exercise of that control. 127 Because plain-
tiff was attempting to hold Kirby directly responsible for its own conduct
rather than vicariously responsible for the acts of its distributor, the dis-
tributor's status as an independent contractor and the amount of control
exercised by Kirby over its distributor were irrelevant. What was rele-
vant was the undisputed fact that Kirby retained control over the method
by which its products were marketed. The Texas Supreme Court held the
manufacturer directly liable because the manufacturer was negligent in
discharging an independent duty to the customer.12 8 The Kirby decision
places franchisors in a Catch-22. If they exercise greater control over hir-
ing, they will face possible increased vicarious liability. If they exercise
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1957).
124. See Arguello, 1998 WL 713277, at *7.
125. 990 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1998).
126. Id. at 735.




no control, they may face direct liability if they are found to have an
independent duty to an injured third party.
The Kirby case was distinguished in Guidry v. National Freight, Inc.129
In that case, a University of Texas co-ed was raped by a long-haul truck
driver who made an unauthorized stop in Austin. Guidry sued National,
the truck driver's employer, for negligent hiring. If National had checked
the truck driver's background, it would have discovered that he had a
history of sexual misconduct contained in his military records, criminal
records, and previous employment records. The Austin court distin-
guished the Kirby case because Guidry was not a member of any vulnera-
ble or specially protected group with whom the truck driver could be
expected to come into contact during his work. a30 Consequently, the sex-
ual assault was not foreseeable.
When a franchisor is faced with vicarious liability for claims arising out
of alleged racial or gender discrimination committed by a franchisee, the
issue is whether the franchisor is an "employer" under the relevant stat-
ute. For example, in Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 31 a waitress at Pizza
Hut was sexually assaulted by a male customer and sued her employer,
the franchisee, and Pizza Hut, the franchisor, alleging a hostile work envi-
ronment sexual harassment claim. In order to establish a prima facie case
under Title VII, Ms. Lockard was required to prove that Pizza Hut was
her employer. 132 Referring to Lambertsen v. Utah Department of Correc-
tions,133 the court identified three approaches to determining whether an
entity is an employer for Title VII purposes: (1) the common law agency
inquiry; (2) the "hybrid" common law-economic realities method; and (3)
the single employer or true economic realities test.134
Under the common law agency inquiry, the focus is on whether the
putative employer controls the means and manner by which the work is
accomplished. The hybrid method combines the focus on the common
law right to control with additional factors relating to the degree of eco-
nomic dependence of the worker on the putative employer. 135 The single
employer test considers the following factors: (1) interrelation of opera-
tions, (2) centralized control of labor relations, (3) common management,
and (4) common ownership or financial control. 136 The key factor of the
four-part test is whether the putative employer has centralized control of
labor relations. Broad general statements regarding employment matters
are not enough; a franchisor must control the day-to-day employment de-
cisions of a franchisee. To prove her claim under the single employer test,
Ms. Lockard pointed to the fact that: (1) the policies and procedures in
129. 944 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no pet.).
130. See id. at 811.
131. 162 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1998).
132. See id. at 1069 (citing Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1361 (10th Cir. 1993).
133. 79 F.3d 1024, 1024 (10th Cir. 1996).





effect at the restaurant were those of Pizza Hut; (2) Pizza Hut and the
franchisee set forth a joint defense to the EEOC complaint; (3) Pizza
Hut's letter to the EEOC said Ms. Lockard was employed by the "Com-
pany"; and (4) an individual was a vice president of both the franchisor
and the franchisee. 137 The court found these facts insufficient to satisfy
the common management requirement of the single employer test.138
There was no evidence Pizza Hut controlled the day-to-day employment
decisions of the franchisee. Although Pizza Hut's policies were in effect
at the restaurant, there was no evidence indicating what role, if any, Pizza
Hut played in implementing the policies. The court, therefore, reversed
the jury verdict against Pizza Hut.
H. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
Under Texas law, the elements of tortious interference with respect to
prospective business relations are: (1) a reasonable probability that the
plaintiff would have entered into a contractual relationship, (2) a mali-
cious and intentional act, performed with the purpose of harming the
plaintiff, that prevented the relationship from occurring, (3) without priv-
ilege or justification to do that act, and (4) actual harm or damage re-
sulted from defendant's interference. 139 In Miller v. KFC Corp.,140 the
franchisees of KFC sued for KFC's failure to award them a "3N1" (KFC,
Taco Bell, and Pizza Hut) franchise at an outlet mall asserting a claim for,
among other things, tortious interference with prospective business rela-
tionships. Plaintiffs claimed that KFC tortiously interfered with their
prospective business relations by denying their request to expand,
thereby precluding them from engaging in business with prospective pa-
trons. The court denied a motion to dismiss this claim.141
The opposite result was reached in Re/Max of Texas, Inc. v. Katar
Corp.142 In that case, Re/Max licensed Katar to operate a Re/Max
franchise. Katar decided to sell the franchise, but because Katar was de-
linquent in payments to Re/Max, Re/Max refused to honor the exclusivity
provision of the agreement. The sale fell through, and Katar sued for,
among other things, tortious interference with its prospective sale. The
district court rendered judgment against Katar on its interference
claim. 143
137. See id. at 1070-71.
138. See id. at 1071.
139. See Gaia Techs., Inc. v. Recycled Prods. Corp., 175 F.3d 365, 377 (5th Cir. 1999);
Hill v. Heritage Resources, Inc., 964 S.W.2d 89, 109 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, pet.
denied).
140. No. CIV.A.3:99-CV-1566-D, 1999 WL 820389, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 1999).
141. See id. at *2.
142. 989 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. 1999).




The relationships between franchisors and franchisees can violate Sher-
man Act prohibitions against tying and attempted monopolization. For
example, in Re/Max International, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc.,' 44 the Sixth
Circuit reversed the grant of a summary judgment against Re/Max and its
franchisees and remanded the case for further proceedings. 145 In that
case, Re/Max, a national real estate brokerage franchisor, and its fran-
chisees brought suit against two local real estate firms operating in north-
east Ohio alleging antitrust violations in connection with the defendants'
practice of paying brokers associated with Re/Max franchisees lower
commissions on split-commission transactions. Re/Max paid brokers 95
to 100% commission on real estate sales less expenses. Local real estate
agencies required agents to pay one-half their commissions to the agency.
To deter their agents from going to Re/Max, two defendant agencies re-
duced the commission to Re/Max agents who were involved in transac-
tions with them from 50% to between 25 - 30%. Re/Max sued under
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, as well as state antitrust laws, alleg-
ing that the two incumbent agencies dominated the relevant market, and
the adverse split policy was a concerted refusal to deal or group boycott
in contravention of section 1 of the Sherman Act. In addition, Re/Max
contended that defendants' conduct constituted an illegal monopoly or
attempt to monopolize in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.146
The district court dismissed judgment on plaintiffs' section 1 conspiracy
claim "because there was insufficient evidence that the defendants mutu-
ally agreed to adopt adverse splits, rather than imposing them indepen-
dently."1 47 The district court granted summary judgment on plaintiffs'
section 2 monopolization claims because plaintiffs failed to meet their
burden of defining the relevant geographic markets in which the defend-
ants were alleged to wield monopoly power and also failed to show de-
fendants had the power to set prices or exclude competition in the
geographic markets plaintiffs claimed. 148
The Sixth Circuit reversed as to both the section 1 conspiracy and the
section 2 monopolization claims. The Sixth Circuit held that the district
court erred in finding plaintiffs had not adduced evidence of defendants'
alleged conspiracy sufficient to survive summary judgment. 49 Although
the facts show that defendants had opportunities to conspire; they im-
posed adverse splits at almost the same time and in almost the same man-
ner, and that their principals had preexisting business relationships
seemed to show a conspiracy, additional circumstantial evidence that ad-
verse splits would not have been in either defendant's independent eco-
144. 173 F.3d 995 (6th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, 68 USL W 3138 (1999).
145. See id. at 1025-26.
146. See id. at 1000-02.
147. Id. at 1008.
148. See id. at 1004.
149. See id. at 1016.
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nomic interest, and the statement of a witness that Realty One's CEO
admitted entering into an agreement were sufficient to enable a reasona-
ble jury to conclude that the defendants conspired. The court also con-
cluded that the record contained sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury
to conclude that the likely effect of defendants' conduct was primarily
anticompetitive. 150
The appellate court also concluded that the district court erroneously
dismissed plaintiffs' section 2 monopolization claims. "Although the dis-
trict court correctly concluded that Re/Max failed to define the relevant
geographic markets, the court erroneously rejected evidence tending to
show that the defendants had the ability to exclude competition.' 5 1 For
instance, Re/Max presented evidence showing that the adverse split pol-
icy had prevented new Re/Max franchises from forming and may have
driven several franchises out of business.1 52
Finally, the district court held that the franchisor and sub-franchisor
plaintiffs had no standing to bring antitrust claims because their injury
was too indirect. The Sixth Circuit disagreed reasoning that:
[T]he defendants prevented Re/Max agents from earning their nor-
mal commission on most transactions, which in turn prevented Re/
Max's 100 [%] Concept from functioning, which prevented Re/Max
from attracting top agents, which prevented Re/Max franchises from
succeeding, which prevented Re/Max from earning revenue from
those franchises and agents and from opening new franchises. While
this chain of causation is long, it is direct and unbroken. 5 3
To avoid duplicative damage awards, the court required that if Re/Max
franchisees are successful on remand, the franchisees should be fully com-
pensated for any lost earnings. "Once these franchisees are made whole,
the franchisor-plaintiffs will then be due their portion."'1 54 Because dam-
ages could be apportioned without duplicative recovery, the court re-
versed the dismissal of the franchisor and sub-franchisor plaintiffs. 155
In Metro Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,156 the Fifth Circuit
granted summary judgment for a manufacturer in a dealer suit alleging
that the manufacturer's pricing program constituted vertical price fixing
in violation of the Sherman Act and price discrimination under the
Robinson-Patman Act.1 57 Ford had a pricing program known as competi-
tive price assistance ("CPA") used to reduce the wholesale price of a
truck to authorized Ford dealers. Ford conducted an audit of Metro and
discovered that Metro was receiving more CPA than it was entitled to.




153. Re/Max, 173 F.3d at 1023.
154. Id.
155. See id. at 1025-26.
156. 145 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1068 (1999).
157. See id. at 323-24, 328.
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by Metro. In response, Metro filed suit against Ford for price discrimina-
tion under the Texas Antitrust Act. Ford removed the action to federal
court on the basis that the Texas Antitrust Act does not prohibit price
discrimination and, therefore, Metro's antitrust claim for price discrimi-
nation could arise, if at all, only under the federal Robinson-Patman Act.
With respect to Metro's claim that Ford's CPA program constituted verti-
cal price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act, the district court found
the lack of evidence of an agreement fatal. With respect to Metro's con-
tention that Ford's CPA program resulted in price discrimination, the
court found that Metro was treated the same as all other Ford dealers
with respect to CPA for products of like grade and quality.158 Therefore,
the Fifth Circuit held that price discrimination did not exist, and no viola-
tion of the Robinson-Patman Act occurred. 159
In Chawla v. Shell Oil Co.,' 60 several Shell brand gasoline dealers sued
Shell Oil Company for illegal tying, fraud, and price discrimination in
violation of the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Robinson-Patman
Act. The dealership agreements required the dealers to use Shell's credit
card processing system and charged the dealers more for gasoline than
non-dealers. Plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that Shell Oil's oper-
ation of its "pay-at-the-pump" program, that allowed consumers to pay
for gas with a credit card at the gasoline pump, resulted in an illegal tying
arrangement. More specifically, the plaintiffs claimed the practice of co-
ercing plaintiffs to agree to lease "island card readers" ("ICRs") and forc-
ing plaintiffs to agree to utilize only Shell's chosen bank to process the
credit card transactions created an illegal tying arrangement in violation
of the Sherman Act. The tying products were Shell brand gasoline and
the Shell trademark, and the tied product was Shell's selected bank for
processing transactions.' 6' The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to
state a legally cognizable claim of illegal tying because the tying arrange-
ment arose from contractual provisions contained in the dealer agree-
ments between Shell and its dealers. 162 The court also held that the
plaintiffs "failed to allege any anti-competitive effect on the market for
the tied products, ICRs and related credit card processing services."'1 63
Addressing the alleged injury to retail gasoline consumers, the court con-
cluded that Shell gasoline was not a legally cognizable relevant market. 164
Therefore, plaintiffs had not alleged the defendant had market power in
the tying product and therefore could not state a claim under either the
Sherman or Clayton Acts.
For franchisors, the significant part of the court's analysis was the effect
of a contractual relationship on antitrust analysis. Plaintiffs complained
158. See id. at 325.
159. See id. at 326.
160. 75 F. Supp. 2d 626 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
161. See id. at 630-31.





that the tying arrangement in the ICR policy was forcing plaintiffs out of
business because plaintiffs were "locked in" to the ICR policy in order to
continue their supply of Shell gasoline. The court concluded that the Ko-
dak165 "lock in" theory did not govern plaintiffs' tying claims because the
plaintiffs' had a preexisting and continuing contractual relationships with
defendant. 166 Plaintiffs were "locked in" to defendant's ICR policy be-
cause of their supply contracts and contractual marketing requirements
rather than because of any market power Shell unlawfully exerted in the
market for its own brand of gasoline. The court concluded that
"[p]laintiffs' challenge to [d]efendant's ICR policy amount[ed] to an at-
tack on the scope of the parties' franchise relationship, and thus
sound[ed] in contract, or conceivably tort, not antitrust.' 67
The court expressly declined to follow Wilson v. Mobil Oil Corp.,168
which held that Kodak was applicable in a franchise situation, and that
there was no "principled distinction . . . between the franchise context
and the durable equipment market involved in Kodak."'1 69 In addition,
the court found that Kodak failed to assist plaintiffs because plaintiffs did
not allege that defendant's tying arrangement had an anticompetitive ef-
fect on the ICR market or the market for bank processing services of ICR
transactions. Thus, plaintiffs failed as a matter of law to allege an illegal
tying claim.1 70
The court also rejected plaintiffs' second illegal tying theory-that de-
fendant's policy harmed retail gasoline purchasers. The court found that
plaintiffs' allegations as to retail consumers failed as a matter of law for
two reasons. First, the court found that plaintiffs' failure to allege there
were no close substitutes for Shell gasoline from the consumer's perspec-
tive defeated a viable relevant market. Second, plaintiffs failed to allege
defendant's ICR policy created an adverse effect on the retail consumer
market for any tied product because consumers viewed the gasoline they
purchased and related credit card processing service as part of the same
transaction and thus did not demand the products separately. 171
The court also dismissed plaintiffs' Clayton Act tying claim because the
Clayton Act applies only when both the tying and the tied products are
goods.' 72 Plaintiffs' tying claim that the required lease of defendant's
choice of ICRs was part and parcel of the "pay-at-the-pump" service in-
volved only services, not goods. Therefore, the claim was outside the
165. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
166. See Chawla, 75 F. Supp. at 638.
167. Id. at 639; see also Queen City Pizza v. Domino's Pizza, 124 F.3d 430, 441 (3d Cir.
1997), cert. denied, Boughan's, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, 523 U.S. 1059 (1998) ("Unlike the
plaintiffs in Kodak, plaintiffs here must purchase products from Domino's Pizza not be-
cause of Domino's market power over a unique product, but because they are bound by
contract ... plaintiffs' remedy, if any, is in contract, not under the antitrust laws.").
168. 940 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. La. 1996).
169. Chawla, 75 F. Supp. at 641 n.17.
170. See id. at 641-42.
171. See id. at 642-43.
172. See id. at 644-45.
2000] 1083
SMU LAW REVIEW
scope of the Clayton Act. 173 With respect to plaintiffs' Robinson-Patman
Act claim, the court ordered plaintiffs to file an amended complaint that
would demonstrate that a competitive injury had occurred. 174
J. DTPA
Franchisees continue to assert claims based on the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA).175 In Miller v.
KFC, 176 a franchisee sued KFC and Taco Bell after they denied plaintiff's
request for a new "3N1" (KFC, Taco Bell, and Pizza Hut) franchise in an
outlet mall. The franchisors' motion to dismiss the DTPA count was
granted.177 Under the DTPA, a "consumer" includes an individual, part-
nership or corporation which seeks or acquires by purchase or lease any
goods or services. 178 To qualify as a consumer, a person must establish
that: (1) he sought or acquired goods or services by purchase or lease and
(2) the goods or services formed the basis of the complaint.' 79 Franchise
agreements can involve the transfer of goods or services for purposes of
the DTPA. 80 However, the goods and services must form the basis of
the complaint. 18' In Miller, plaintiff alleged various misrepresentations
and unconscionable actions in business negotiations and refusal to grant
plaintiff's application for a franchise outlet. Because these claims did not
involve the goods or services purchased, plaintiff's DTPA claims were
dismissed.
V. FEDERAL ISSUES IMPACTING FRANCHISES
A. TRADEMARKS AND TRADENAMES
Trademarks and other intellectual property are at the heart of every
franchise system and, as a matter of course, are frequently at issue in
litigation. These items are particularly litigious because a company or
product name is a symbol that indicates who stands behind a service or
good and "may be a valuable corporate asset as it facilitates communica-
173. See id.
174. See Chawla, 75 F. Supp. at 654.
175. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 2000).
176. No. CIV.A.3:99-CV-1566-D, 1999 WL 820389 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 1999).
177. See id. at *1, 4.
178. TEX. Bus. & COM. COE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 2000).
179. See Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, 618 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tex. 1981).
180. See Texas Cookie Co. v. Hendricks & Peralta, Inc., 747 S.W.2d 873, 877 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied) (purchaser of franchise qualified as consumer due
to provision of collateral services).
181. See, e.g., Americom Distrib. Corp. v. ACS Communications, Inc., 990 F.2d 223,227
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 867 (1993) (a cause of action based on suspension of dis-
tributorship, without any defect in purchased goods, does not properly come under
DTPA); Meineke Discount Muffler v. Jaynes, 999 F.2d 120, 125 (5th Cir. 1993) (franchisee
whose complaint focused on validity of trademark ownership not a consumer under
DTPA); Footloose, Inc. v. Stride Rite Children's Group, 923 F. Supp. 114, 116-17 (N.D.
Tex. 1995) (distributor whose complaint was based on termination of distribution agree-
ment, rather than goods and services, not a consumer).
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tion with a customer. 1 82 The value of a trademark, and its associated
good will, generally increases as advertising and sales using the mark con-
tinue. Pursuant to the terms of the Trademark Act of 1946 (the "Lanham
Act"), 183 a trademark is defined as a distinctive word, name, symbol,
phrase, design, or combination thereof that is used by a business to iden-
tify and distinguish its own products from those of other businesses. A
"service mark," on the other hand, is the same thing as a trademark but
identifies and distinguishes services rather than tangible products.18 4
Franchisors generally utilize three different sections of the Lanham Act
to enforce their rights as to trademarks and service marks. First, section
32 of the Lanham Act provides, inter alia, that:
[a]ny person who shall, without the consent of the registrant (a) use
in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imita-
tion of the registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive ... shall be liable in a civil action by the
registrant .... 185
Second, a franchisor may use § 43(a) of the Lanham Act which pro-
vides in pertinent part that:
[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services...
uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol . . . or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false
or misleading representation of fact, which (A) is likely to cause con-
fusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation.., or as
to origin, sponsorship, or approval of ... goods [or] services ... shall
be liable in a civil action .... 186
Finally, franchisors may also seek redress pursuant to section 43(c) of
the Lanham Act which provides in pertinent part that:
[t]he owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the princi-
pals of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to
an injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce
of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has be-
come famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the
mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in this
subsection.1 87
In the past year, court decisions have continued to refine the applica-
tion of these doctrines regarding the protection of intellectual property
rights in franchise disputes.
In McDonald's Corp. v. Robertson,188 the Eleventh Circuit upheld a
182. CardService, Int'l, Inc. v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737, 741 (E.D. VA 1997) (citing
MTV Networds, Inc. v. Curry, 897 F. Supp. 202, 203-04 (S.D. N.Y. 1994)).
183. 15 U.S.C. § 1111 (1994).
184. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
185. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1994).
186. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1994).
187. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1994).
188. 147 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 1998).
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Florida district court's granting McDonald's a preliminary injunction
against trademark infringement, preventing a former franchisee from
continuing to run a McDonald's restaurant.1 89 In the Eleventh Circuit,
when a franchisee is contesting a termination by a franchisor, the
franchisor, as part of its burden in proving likely success on the merits,
must demonstrate that the termination was proper in order to obtain a
trademark injunction. 90 In the instant case, McDonald's terminated the
former franchisee because of its failure to comply with safety require-
ments and other franchise regulations. The franchisee countered that the
termination was nothing more than an excuse for McDonald's to move
the restaurant to a different location. This case is unique because other
circuits have held that the propriety of termination is irrelevant when
considering an injunction of the Lanham Act. 191
In Foodmex, Inc. v. Foodmaker International Franchising, Inc,192 Food-
maker, the international franchisor of "Jack in the Box," terminated
Foodmex, its master licensee for Mexico. The termination was allegedly a
result of Foodmex's breach of the parties' master licensing agreement,
that included Foodmex's use of products from non-approved suppliers in
its restaurants. After being terminated, Foodmex continued to operate
using Foodmaker's trademarks. Foodmex then sued Foodmaker in Cali-
fornia federal court for wrongful termination, breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference, and violations of
the California Franchise Relations Act. 193 Upon review of the master
licensing agreement, the court concluded that Foodmex had violated the
agreement's mandatory standards and continued to violate them even af-
ter being provided with express written notice. In the court's view, Food-
maker had proper grounds to terminate Foodmex and, therefore,
dismissed Foodmex's claims. More importantly, because Foodmex was
promptly terminated, its continued use of Foodmaker's trademarks after
the termination date constituted trademark infringement, dilution, and
unfair competition. A permanent injunction was issued against Foodmex
and its licensees enjoining them from further use of Foodmaker's marks
and ordering Foodmex to give notice of the injunction to the Mexican
courts and the proper Mexican government agencies. 194
In Piccoli A/S v. Calvin Klein Jeanswear Co.,' 95 a Danish licensee of
Calvin Klein jeans provoked a dispute over the extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Lanham Act. Piccoli, a former licensee with an exclusive li-
cense to distribute Calvin Klein products in Scandanavia, sued Calvin
Klein ("CK") Jeanswear, an American licensee, for breach of contract,
breach of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment,
189. See id. at 13 14.
190. See id. at 1308.
191. See supra Section IV(A) for a further discussion of this case.
192. No. 96CV2090-J, slip op. (S.D. Cal. June 28, 1999).
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. 19 F. Supp. 2d 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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tortious interference, unfair competition and Lanham Act violations, af-
ter CK Jeanswear began exporting excess inventory to Denmark to be
sold at lower end retail stores.196 CK Jeanswear moved to dismiss. The
court dismissed the breach of contract claim and Piccoli's argument that it
was a third party beneficiary. The court also dismissed the claim for
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing since there was
no contract. 197 Additionally, the court dismissed Piccoli's claims of unjust
enrichment and tortious interference on similar grounds. 198 The court
further rejected Piccoli's section 32 Lanham Act claim for trademark in-
fringement because it lacked sufficient ownership interest to support such
a claim.199
The court, however, spent a considerable amount of time analyzing sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act and whether it has extraterritorial applica-
tion. The court recognized that there "is little doubt that the Lanham Act
has some extraterritorial effect" 20 0 and pointed out three factors for de-
termining whether extraterritory application of the Lanham Act is appro-
priate: (1) where the defendant is United States citizen, (2) whether there
exists a conflict between the defendant's trademark rights under foreign
law and the plaintiff's trademark rights under domestic law, and (3)
whether defendant's activities have a substantial effect on United States
commerce.2 0' Because Piccoli claimed that CK Jeanswear had engaged
in a "use of the physical stream of American commerce that was essential
to the alleged infringement," 20 2 the court refused to dismiss the Lanham
Act claim based on the current status of the litigation.20 3 Thus, after sum-
marizing the case law on the issue, the court held that the actions in the
United States by the defendant precluded dismissal of the Lanham Act
claims at the motion to dismiss stage of the lawsuit.20 4
B. BANKRUPTCY
A few decisions rendered this year illustrate the potential effects the
United States Bankruptcy Code has on the relationship between
franchisors and franchisees. For the most part, the Bankruptcy Code has
been used in the past as a shield to protect franchisees who avoid obliga-
tions under the franchise agreement, or used by franchisors as a sword to
force a debtor franchisee into involuntary bankruptcy. 20 5 Given the pos-
sible uses by either party to a franchise agreement, it is important to note
196. See id. at 160.
197. See id. at 163-65.
198. See id. at 167-68.
199. See id. at 168.
200. Id. at 170.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 171.
203. See id. at 172.
204. See id.
205. See, e.g., Matter of Sims, 994 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that three affiliates




the way the Bankruptcy Code may be used to alter the expectations cre-
ated by the franchise agreement. The following cases give insight into the
alteration of expectations that may result from the Bankruptcy Code.
In In re 6100 Columbus, Inc.,206 the franchise agreement between the
parties provided for automatic termination upon the happening of certain
events, including the failure of the franchisee to satisfy a final judgment
for thirty days or more without posting of a bond. The franchisee lost in
arbitration with a third party and had a final judgment entered against it
based upon the arbitration award. The franchisee appealed, but failed to
post bond. The franchisor, pursuant to its contract rights, delivered a ter-
mination notice to the franchisee. The franchisee then filed for bank-
ruptcy that same afternoon. Over the next several weeks following
issuance of the termination notice, the franchisor took possession of the
franchisee's offices and transferred its telephone numbers.2 0 7
Pursuant to section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, the filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition triggers an automatic stay of several actions against the
debtor's estate, including "any act to obtain possession of property of the
estate ... or to exercise control over property of the estate. ' '2° 8 These
prohibitions will not apply to prevent a lessor from taking back its prop-
erty if the lease was terminated before the filing of bankruptcy. Further-
more, the prohibitions of section 362 do not prevent a franchisor from
taking back its property if the franchise agreement is terminated as a mat-
ter of law before the bankruptcy petition was stamped by the clerk of the
court. In such a situation, a lease or franchise agreement will no longer
be considered an asset of the estate.20 9
The franchisee sought a temporary restraining order, and argued that
the franchisor's conduct improperly interfered with the assets of the
bankruptcy estate. The court concluded that the franchisee failed to es-
tablish: (1) its likelihood of success on the merits and (2) that it faced
irreparable harm from the franchisor's operation of the business.210
The lesson to the franchisee contemplating bankruptcy is to remain vig-
ilant in order to avoid losing Bankruptcy Code protections by virtue of
the swift delivery of a termination notice delivered prior to a bankruptcy
filing. In the instance where a bankruptcy trustee is appointed to reor-
ganize or liquidate an estate for the benefit of creditors, the franchisor
may often obtain a new audience for its claims which may not have previ-
ously persuaded the debtor. The role of trustee, however, is a limited one
and cannot bind the debtor without court approval. Where the court de-
termines that the resolution of a debtor's claim will not bring substantial
value to the bankruptcy estate, the court may order that the cause of
action be abandoned back to the debtor for prosecution.
206. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) $ 11462 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio June 24, 1998).
207. See id.
208. See 11 U.S.C. §362(a)(3) (1994).
209. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1994).
210. See In re 6100 Columbus, Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) § 1146Z (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio June 24, 1998).
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In Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,211 Chrysler termi-
nated its dealership agreement with Northview in 1991. Northview filed
for bankruptcy, and was later converted to Chapter 7, at which time a
trustee was appointed. Northview, without the trustee's knowledge, filed
a claim against Chrysler. When the trustee learned of the suit, he took
control and agreed to settle the matter in exchange for Chrysler paying
$115,000 and withdrawing its claims against the estate. The settlement
with the trustee expressly provided that it was subject to approval of the
bankruptcy court. 212 Northview objected vigorously to approval of the
settlement and moved to compel the trustee to abandon the litigation
back to the debtor because those claims were of "inconsequential value
to the estate. '213 The bankruptcy court ordered the lawsuit abandoned to
the debtor's principals and denied as moot the trustee's motion to ap-
prove the settlement. 214 Northview then forwarded a new settlement de-
mand to Chrysler for $3,500,000. Chrysler moved to enforce the
settlement agreement and the district court granted Chrysler's motion to
enforce the original settlement.215 The Third Circuit later reversed in all
respects, holding that the trustee's authority was limited to agreeing to
settle matters subject to court approval, a condition that was never
met.2 16 Accordingly, the trustee could impair Northview's interest only
in accordance with the bankruptcy court or with their consent.
C. CIVIL RIGHTS
In Brown v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,217 the plaintiff was a minor-
ity owner of a tire dealership. The plaintiff claimed to have received une-
qual treatment in comparison to the treatment accorded to white
franchisees and that he had therefore been denied an appropriate share
of new franchise opportunities, loans, advertising funds, insurance cover-
age and, other business opportunities. Plaintiff filed a federal action
claim for violations of section 1982 and alleged claims for breach of
franchise agreement.218 In analyzing this matter, the court determined
that the existence of the franchise agreement between the parties was
relevant only for the 1oint that it placed the plaintiff in the group of fran-
chisees with whom Goodyear traditionally dealt.21 9 The court concluded
that the plaintiff did have a cause of action under section 1982 if, and, or
when other franchisees were accorded rights to buy and sell certain kinds
of property beyond their respective franchise agreements. The court rec-
211. 186 F.3d (3rd Cir. 1999).
212. See id. at 347-48.
213. Id. at 348.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See id. at 352.
217. No. 99C1641, 1999 WL 569543 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 1999).
218. See id. at *1; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994) ("All citizens of the United States
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.").
219. See id. at *2.
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ognized, however, that Illinois provided a two-year statute of limitations
for such claims and ultimately dismissed all of the plaintiff's claims as
untimely. 220
In Adcock v. Chrysler Corp.,221 the Ninth Circuit held that the protec-
tions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not apply to a pro-
spective car dealer who alleged that Chrysler discriminatorily denied a
dealership based on gender. Chrysler won on summary judgment at the
district court level. The primary issue on appeal was whether the contem-
plated dealership agreement created an employment relation triggering
the protections of Title VII.222 The court quickly concluded that the
question of whether a relationship is one of employment or independent
contractual affiliation requires a "fact specific inquiry which depends on
economic realities of the situation. '223 In the court's view, the primary
factor to consider was "the employer's right to control the means and
manner of the worker's performance. '224 In the instant case, the court
viewed the dealership agreement as the only relevant evidence regarding
the parties' relationship and determined that, under the terms of that
agreement, it was the dealer who controlled the day-to-day operations of
the business and had discretion over hiring, advertising and the actual
hours of operation. 225 Accordingly, it was the dealer, not Chrysler, who
owned the vehicles, premises, and equipment in the dealership. This fac-
tor weighed heavily in favor of finding that the dealership created an in-
dependent contractual affiliation. In addition, since Chrysler did not pay
the dealer's salary, benefits or social security taxes, nor did it have exclu-
sive control over the manner of termination, the contemplated relation-
ship was independent.2 26 Accordingly, the district court's summary
judgment ruling was affirmed for want of the requisite employment rela-
tionship required under Title VII to be established. 227
D. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") 228 sets forth several ob-
ligations that franchisors of concepts from hotels to quick-serve restau-
rants must consider. In addition to the Days Inns of America cases
reported last year,229 other cases also demonstrate that the ultimate
boundaries of franchiser liability under the ADA are far from settled. In
220. See id. at *2-*3.
221. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) T 11574 (9th Cir. 1999).
222. See id.




226. See id. at 31,522
227. See Adcock v. Chrysler Corp., Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) s 11574 (9th Cir.
1999).
228. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1998).
229. See United States v. Days Inns of Am., Inc., 151 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 526 U.S. 1016 (1999); see United States v. Days Inns of Am., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d
612 (E.D. Ky. 1998).
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Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition v. Taco Bell Corp.,230 the district
court certified for class treatment the ADA claims of disabled plaintiffs
who challenged the width of customer cue lines at Taco Bell outlets. The
plaintiffs argued that they were required by their disabilities to use wheel
chairs for mobility and were impeded in their efforts to obtain access to
Taco Bell because the lines that the customers were required to use were
narrower than the specifications outlined in the ADA's accessibility
guidelines. Accordingly, plaintiffs claimed that Taco Bell violated the
ADA and the Colorado Anti-discrimination Act.231 Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), the court concluded that the proposed
class satisfied the necessary requirements: (1) the class members were
sufficiently numerous and geographically diverse to make joinder imprac-
ticable; (2) combinations of fact and law existed; (3) the claims of de-
fenses that are represented of parties would be the same as those of the
absent class members; and (4) the representative parties would fairly and
adequately protect the interest of the class concerning the alleged
violations. 23
2
E. NEW FEDERAL SWEEPSTAKES LAW
For many years, the Attorneys General of various states have been en-
gaged in ongoing legal battles with the high-profile magazine publishing
clearing houses over what they consider to be deceptive sweepstakes
soliticitations. Every few years, these lawsuits result in an agreed judg-
ment against the defendants, imposing substantial fines and setting forth
rules to govern the defendants' future sweepstakes promotions. Within a
year or so after each agreed judgment, the defendants invariably pushed
the envelope and the cycle continued. In 1999, three separate bills affect-
ing direct mail sweepstakes were introduced in the United States Sen-
ate-the Deceptive Mail Prevention Enforcement Act, the Deceptive
Sweepstakes Mailings Elimination Act and the Honesty in Sweepstakes
Act. 233 As a result of the introduction of these three bills, President Clin-
ton signed the Deceptive Mail Prevention & Enforcement Act of 1999
(the "Act") into law on December 12, 1999.234 The Act amends federal
law relating to non-mailable material, and imposes new mailability re-
quirements for certain materials relating to sweepstakes and skill con-
tests. Although portions of the Act deal with the mailability of other
matters, franchise systems and other businesses using sweepstakes and
other contests via the mail as part of their marketing strategy are now
faced with the new requirements under this law. This new law requires
that certain disclosures be made in the mailing, in the rules, and on the
order or entry form of the sweepstake or contest. 235 Sweepstakes and
230. 184 F.R.D. 354 (D. Colo. 1999).
231. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (1998).
232. See Colorado Cross Disability Coalition, 184 F.R.D. at 357-61.
233. S. 301, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 170, 106th Cong. (1999).




contest materials failing to make the required disclosures will be disposed
of by the U.S. Postal Service.2 36 Additionally, the sponsors may be sub-
ject to fines and civil penalties ranging from $25,000 to $2 million depend-
ing upon the size of the mailing.237
The new law also allows individuals to elect to be excluded from
sweepstakes or contest mailings. Sponsors of these types of promotions
are required to establish (and to conspicuously disclose the existence of)
a notification system for individuals to make the selection. The conse-
quences of mailing sweepstakes or contest materials to an individual who
has properly submitted a removal request include civil penalties of up to
$10,000 for each mailing, and a private right of action by the recipient for
injunctive relief and/or damages measured by the greater of $500 or ac-
tual damages. The reckless mailing of materials may also subject the
sponsor to civil liability in an amount of $10,000 per violation for each
mailing to an individual. Furthermore, the Act does not preempt any
state or local law that imposes more restrictive requirements, regulations,
damages, costs or penalties, nor does it prohibit any authorized state offi-
cial from proceeding in state court on the basis of an alleged violation of
any general or specific civil or criminal statute of a state.238
VI. PROCEDURE
A. JURISDICTION
The nature of the franchise relationship makes for an interesting deter-
mination of proper jurisdiction and venue. Generally, a state court has
personal jurisdiction over any action brought in its courts if the parties'
activities comply with the state's long arm statute and if the exercise of
jurisdiction affords due process. Where a franchisee is required to pay
royalties and/or send regular reports to a forum state, where out of state
investors guarantee a performance scheduled to occur within a forum
state, or where courts simply believe that a franchisee has purposely
availed itself to the benefits of a relationship with a franchisor in the fo-
rum state, jurisdiction will usually be established. Although there were
several cases outside of the Texas dealing with this situation, the case of
Fish v. Tandy Corp.,2 39 as discussed in last year's update, gives clear gui-
dance to franchisees who are sued in a franchisor's home state. Generally
speaking, Texas courts will find sufficient contacts by the franchisee to
satisfy personal jurisdiction in the franchisor's forum state-Texas.
236. See id. at § 104.
237. See id. at § 106.
239. Robert E. Vinson, Jr., a partner of Strasburger & Price, L.L.P., presented The
Official Rules: A Primer on Sweepstakes Law for Franchise and Distribution Systems to the
Dallas Bar Association Franchise and Distribution Law Section on December 21, 1999.
For a more indepth analysis of the new sweepstakes law Mr. Vinson may be contacted at
vinsonr@strasburger.com.
239. 948 S.W.2d 886, 896 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied).
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B. CHOICE OF LAW AND FORUM
The outcome of litigation in the franchise context is often influenced by
the choice of law and forum. Because of this fact, most franchisors will
insist on choice of venue/forum clauses in their respective franchise/li-
cense agreements. The following case lends insight into how courts will
treat these clauses. In Snapper, Inc. v Redan,240 a franchise contract and
its related guarantees provided for all litigation to occur in Georgia state
or federal court at the sole discretion of Snapper.241 One of the distribu-
tors later sued Snapper in New Jersey federal court. Snapper then sued
the guarantors of the distributor in Georgia state court, seeking to collect
a large debt. The guarantors later removed the Georgia case to federal
court and then moved to transfer the entire case to New Jersey for con-
solidation.242 Snapper's motion to remand to state court was granted by
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia on
the grounds that the guarantors had waived their right to removal by
agreeing to the forum selection clause.243 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's ruling stating that the forum selection clause granted
"Snapper the absolute right to choose the forum for litigation. '244 Snap-
per thus demonstrates the extent to which a contract can enable a
franchisor to control the forum, especially where the court is not hostile
to forum selection clauses.
An example of what happens when a franchisor does not provide a
forum selection clause in their franchise agreement is found in Bertrand
v. McDonald's Corp.2 45 In this case, the Bertrands filed suit against Mc-
Donald's claiming that by approving them as McDonald's franchisees
McDonald's had lured them into selling their Virgin Island businesses
and moving to Argentina for training and site selection. Once McDon-
ald's had signed them up for this program, McDonald's revoked and re-
placed the offer of the desirable locations for ones less attractive. The
Bertrands then refused the locations offered to them by McDonald's and
were subsequently denied the right to operate any McDonald's franchise.
McDonald's sought to dismiss the case under Rule 19(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to join indespensible parties, and also
sought dismissal on grounds of forum non-convenience. In the absence
of a contractual forum selection clause, the court concluded that when
the factors are either a evenly balanced or in favor of protecting the
plaintiff's choice of forum motion to dismiss for forum non-convenience
will be denied.246 The court reasoned was that Virgin Island's jurors have
an interest in deciding cases in which the allegations include luring Virgin
Island residents and business people to sell their assets and leave the ter-
240. 171 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 1999).
241. See id. at 1252.
242. See id. at 1251.
243. See id. at 1251-52.
244. Id. at 1260.
245. No. 96-275, 1998 WL 777032 (D.V.I. Aug. 21, 1998).
246. See id. at *3, *4.
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ritory for business opportunities elsewhere. Thus, the court declined to
dismiss the action or to disturb plaintiff's choice of forum.247
C. CLASS ACTIONS
In E&V Slack, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co.,248 plaintiffs comprising of "[a]ll
past and present lessee-dealers of Shell gas stations in the United States
who participated in Shell's Variable Rent Program" sought certification
as a class.249 The State District Court refused to certify the class action
finding that the putative class did not satisfy the requirements for class
certification under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a). The appellate
court affirmed the lower court's finding. 250 The plaintiffs, all former Shell
dealers, asserted that the Variable Rent Program was designed to collect
secret rent in excess of the contract rent specified in the leases with Shell,
and also alleged breach of contract in a variety of common law statutory
fraud claims. The appellate court, considering all evidence in the light
most favorable to the trial court, determined that the lower court's ruling
was correct.25 1 The appellate court reasoned that the putative class may
not be fairly and adequately represented because of the conflict of inter-
est between the named representatives, all of whom were former deal-
ers-and at least one of whom operated a gas leased station that
competed with Shell-and the rest of the class. The dichotomy became
clear because while current dealers were concerned about damaging
Shell's reputation as a result of the lawsuit, the plaintiffs and other former
dealers had no similar concern. Furthermore, there was evidence to sug-
gest that common questions of law and fact did not predominate. Thus, a
conflict of interest existed between former dealers interested in maximiz-
ing damages, and current dealers interested in the long term financial
health of Shell. Under such circumstances, Texas courts will not favor
class certification.
D. ARBITRATION
A review of the leading reported decisions relating to arbitration dem-
onstrates that arbitration clauses are viewed, at least by federal courts, as
valid and enforceable methods of conflict resolution. For the most part,
this acquiescence to arbitration clauses can be traced to the preemptive
sweep of the Federal Arbitration Act.25 2 Notwithstanding this favorable
treatment, parties seeking to enforce an arbitration clause need to be
aware of three potential pitfalls. First, to enforce an arbitration clause,
the franchisor should expressly provide an arbitration clause in each gen-
eration of its franchise contracts. Second, in seeking to enforce an arbi-
247. See id. at *4.
248. 969 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet.).
249. Id. at 567.
250. See id. at 571.
251. See id. at 567, 571.
252. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-13 (Supp. 1999).
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tration clause, a franchisor should always seek federal court jurisdiction
pursuant to the terms of the Federal Arbitration Act. If federal jurisdic-
tion is not available, the franchisor should still attempt to rely on the
Federal Arbitration Act. Third, the language used in the arbitration
clause should be clear and concise and drafted with expansive language
that leaves nothing to the judicial imagination for enforcement.
In instances where the franchisor wants to use arbitration as the
method of dispute resolution, the franchisor must include an express arbi-
tration clause within the franchise agreement. The franchisor in In re
Howard253 learned this rule the hard way. In 1993, Whigham & Associ-
ates ("Whigham") and Royal Body Care, Inc. ("RBC") entered into a
distributorship agreement. Whigham acknowledged in the distributor-
ship agreement that it had received RBC's Policies, Procedures and Com-
pensation Plan and that these might be amended and updated from time
to time by RBC. One year later, RBC amended the Policies, Procedures
and Compensation Plan and included and express arbitration clause. In
1997, RBC terminated its distributorship agreement. Whigham then sued
RBC as a result of the termination. RBC attempted to enforce the arbi-
tration clause contained in the 1994 amendment to the Policies, Proce-
dures and Compensation Plan. The trial court denied RBC's argument
for arbitration. The appellate court affirmed, acknowledging that al-
though the FAA applied, Texas law controlled the issues and the general
rules of contract construction required a meeting of the minds with no
material terms left open.254 Accordingly, the court determined that the
arbitration agreement contained in the 1994 amendment was not a policy,
procedure or part of compensation plan and that the arbitration clause
did not conform with the scope of subject matter of the original agree-
ment.2 55 Thus, the court determined that the arbitration agreement was
not a part of the distributor agreement because the arbitration clause was
not in existence when the parties had a meeting of the minds. The court
concluded that the 1994 amendment to arbitrate was a "new contract to
which Whigham did not consent and which is unsupported by considera-
tion. '256 In its reasoning, the court appears troubled by the idea that an
arbitration clause could be slipped into a contract by an amendment with-
out the franchisee's express, contemporaneous consent.
One of the most common defenses to arbitration is waiver. In Subway
Equipment Leasing Corp. v. Forte,257 the Fifth Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court's denial of Doctor's Associates, Inc.'s ("DAI") motion to stay
pending arbitration. The court concluded that DAI had not waived its
right to arbitrate, even though the company's affiliates had sued the
plaintiffs first and then put the plaintiffs into involuntary bankruptcy,
253. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,536 (Tex. App. 1998).
254. See id. at *1, *2.
255. See id. at *2.
256. Id.
257. 169 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 1999).
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causing almost a decade long delay in the arbitration process. 258 Proce-
durally, the case started in 1988 when several franchisees filed a demand
for arbitration against DAI alleging breach of development agreement.
Shortly thereafter, DAI's affiliates, Subway Restaurant's, Inc. ("SRI")
and Subway Equipment Leasing ("SEL"), sued the franchisees in federal
court in Louisiana to recover amounts due under subleases and equip-
ment leases. The franchisees then filed a counterclaim against DAI alleg-
ing the same claims as those in the arbitration. Prior to the filing of the
franchisee's answer and counterclaim, however, SEL presented and filed
involuntary bankruptcy petition against the franchisees. By 1990, two
other DAI affiliates filed involuntary bankruptcy petitions. As a result,
the franchisee's arbitration claims were held in abeyance pending the
bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy proceedings concluded in 1996,
and the franchisees moved to activate their original claims. DAI moved
to stay the action to compel arbitration. The district court denied DAI's
motion, holding that it had waived its right to arbitrate by invoking a
judicial process. The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that asserting unre-
lated litigation as a means of delaying arbitration is not "invoking" the
judicial process such that DAI would have waived its right to arbitrate. 259
The Fifth Circuit also stated that "a party only invokes the judicial pro-




While the Fifth Circuit did not weigh in heavily on the issue of
franchise damages during the survey period, both the First and Third Cir-
cuits issued opinions which provide provocative subject matter for the
franchise community.
In Cooper Distributing Co. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc.,261 several ap-
peals and remands had already taken place between the Third Circuit and
the District Court of New Jersey when the case was once again remanded
on the sole issue of damages.
By way of background, in 1991, Amana sought to terminate Cooper, a
distributor of Amana appliances since 1961, on ten days notice, per the
parties' agreement. The distributor then filed suit in state court for viola-
tion of the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act ("NJFPA"), breaches of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference
with prospective economic advantage, and breach of contract. The case
was removed to federal court. The district court issued a preliminary in-
junction prohibiting Amana from taking any action that would in any way
258. See id. at 329.
259. See id.
260. Id. at 328.
261. 180 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 1999).
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interfere with the distributor's activities as a distributor of Amana prod-
ucts. That injunction was effective until trial in February 1994.
At trial, the jury found Amana liable on all counts and awarded the
distributor $9.375 million in damages, $4.375 million in compensatory
damages on the NJFPA count, $2 million for breach of contract, and $3
million in punitive damages on the tortious interference count. The Third
Circuit affirmed liability under the NJFPA on appeal but reversed the
award of $2 million for breach of contract, holding as a matter of law that
no breach had occurred. 262 The court also vacated the jury's award of $3
million in punitive damages on the tortious interference claim because
the jury had awarded no actual damages on that particular claim. 263 The
court vacated the $4.375 million in NJFPA damages and remanded the
case for a new trial on damages, finding that the jury incorrectly found
that Cooper's franchise was exclusive and thereby had overvalued it.264
The court also found that the jury had been improperly instructed to cal-
culate the value of the franchise from the date of Amana's attempted
termination, rather than the actual date of termination, thus resulting in
double recovery for Cooper.2
65
During a second trial, the district court limited the issue to the fair
market value of the franchise to a hypothetical buyer and seller as of the
date of termination, barring the distributor from seeking recovery under
other damage theories.266 The distributor was awarded $377,000 in the
second trial. The distributor appealed, arguing that the district court
erred in preventing it from proving the value of the franchise to actual
parties, its lost profits from the date of the termination notice and actual
termination date, the value of the distributor's complimentary lines, and
the enhanced value of the franchise due to Amana's later expansion of its
own lines.
On the various appeal points, the Third Circuit held that Amana was
liable to Cooper for a loss equal to the value of the franchise measured by
its fair market value to a hypothetical buyer and seller, minus the value
of assets that could be liquidated by the distributor.267 Thus, the Third
Circuit concluded: (1) that the value to hypothetical, rather than actual
parties, was appropriate; (2) that the district court had indeed erred in
precluding the distributor from offering evidence on loss profits, and,
therefore, reversed and remanded the case on that issue; and (3) that no
new trial was warranted based on the distributor's claim that the district
court improperly precluded it from offering evidence of damages based
on the value of product lines it carried in complement to the Amana
line.268 The court held that even though the distributor might not have




266. See id. at 546.
267. See id. at 547.
268. See id. at 547-48.
2000] 1097
SMU LAW REVIEW
carried the complementary lines if it did not carry the Amana line, that
fact did not have any legal significance. 269 Because those lines were re-
tained by the distributor, the court held that they were properly excluded
from the damages calculation.270
The court also found that while Amana was required by the injunction
to maintain the status quo, it had no obligation to offer additional added
lines to the distributor, even if it offered them to other distributors.
Therefore, evidence of any "enhanced value" that the franchise may have
gained if it had access to the additional lines was excluded properly by the
trial court. 271
Mitigation of damages was the issue in Cooney Industrial Trucks v.
Toyota.272 In Cooney, Cooney Industrial Trucks, Inc. ("CITI") sold
Toyota forklifts in Massachusetts and New Hampshire pursuant to a se-
ries of dealer agreements it had entered with Toyota since 1970. Toyota
removed New Hampshire from CITI's area of primary responsibility, and
later failed to renew its dealership agreement when the agreement ex-
pired, stating that CITI poor sales performance caused both decisions.
CITI sued Toyota for breach of contract and unfair practices under the
Massachusetts Motor Vehicle Dealer Act.
When Toyota chose not to renew the dealership agreement with CITI,
CITI contracted with Mitsubishi Caterpillar to deal Mitsubishi forklifts.
The testimony showed that CITI never intended to represent both Toyota
and Mitsubishi concurrently, and that CITI had entered the agreement
with Mitsubishi in an attempt to mitigate the damages caused by Toyota's
nonrenewal. As a Mitsubishi dealer, CITI made more money than it had
in its relationship with Toyota. The jury found that CITI, in fact, had
avoided its losses by mitigating its damages and, thus, awarded no
damages.
On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the jury charge and judgment rea-
soning that CITI could not have made the profitable contract with Mit-
subishi had its relationship with Toyota not been terminated.273 The
court was unpersuaded by CITI'S unfairness complaint that it bore the
risk of the Mitsubishi operation not being successful. The court stated
that had the Mitsubishi operation failed, Toyota's damages for liability
would not have been offset and the mitigation factor would not have
weighed in so heavily to preclude damages.274
269. See id. at 548.
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. 168 F.3d 545, 546 (1st Cir. 1999).
273. See id. at 546.




In Conley v. DSC Communications Corp.,275 in an unpublished opin-
ion, the Dallas Court of Appeals reformed and affirmed a temporary in-
junction against Troy Conley, a salesperson who had marketed products
for DSC Communications Corp. ("DSC"), a manufacturer of telecommu-
nications equipment.
The court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that Conley's former
and current job positions were substantially similar and that is was proba-
ble that he would use or disclose the confidential information that he had
learned at DSC in performing his new responsibilities at Advanced
Fibre. 276
275. No. 05-98-01051-CV, 1999 WL 89955 (Tex. App.-Dallas Feb. 24, 1999, no pet. h.)
(not designated for publication); see section IV(D), supra for further discussion of Conley
v. DSC Communications Corp.
276. See id. at *8.
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